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In this Note, the author examines measures recentl)• enacted bj• New
Hampshire and Vernumt in response to judicial mandates for education re
form. By implementing district refonn measures in demograpllicallj' similar
environments, the refonn efforts of these two states provide a valuable perspec
tive from which to examine the debate surrounding education finance re
form. Evaluating the experiences of these two New England states, as well as
those of other states committed to education finance refonn, the author con
tends that successful refonn measures must incorporate elements of botlz eq
uity and adequacy. SpecijicaUy, the autlwr proposes that both states'
implementation of a statewide property tax is a progressive step toward equal

ity in education and fairness in taxation. The author concludes that a state
committed to school .finance refonns that are both fair and effective should
expand revenue sources in order to arrive at per-pupil expenditures that will
ensure equity and adequacy.
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INTRODUGI'ION

In Brown v. Board of Education, 1 Chief Justice Warren declared,
"[i] t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education."2 While the
immediate response to Brown was the racial desegregation of Ameri
can public schools, the spirit of Brown manifests itself today in the

effort to effectuate economic desegregation.3 For the last thirty years,
state supreme courts have interpreted state constitutions to require
state education systems to meet basic requirements of adequacy, eq
uity, or both. 4 Thus, "where the state has undertaken to provide it,"
education "is a right which must be made available on equal terms."o
Consequently, it is unconstitutional for a state to delegate its responsi
bility to local districts when those districts vary greatly in their ability

to finance adequate public education. 6 Because every state except Ha~
Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 493.
3
See Elinor Burkett, Drm 't Tread rm My Tax &te, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1996, § 6 (Maga·
zine), at 42.
4
Nearly every state has faced a challenge to the constitutionality of its education
finance system in the last thirty years. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal.
1976) ("Serrano II") (analyzing the school finance system under strict scrutiny because
"education is a fundamental interest"); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977)
("Horton I") ("[I]n light of the Connecticut constitutional recognition of the right to edu·
cation it is, in Connecticut, a 'fundamental' right." (internal citation omitted)); Claremont
Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) ("Claremont II") ("We hold that
in this State a constitutionally adequate public education is a fundamental right."); Brlg·
ham v. State, 692 A2d 384, 394 (Vt. 1997) ("The courts of this state have been no less
forthright in declaring education to be a fundamental obligation of the state."); Scott v.
Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994) ("In sum, we agree with the trial court that
education is a fundamental right under the [state] Constitution."); Pauley v. Kelly, 255
S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (noting that language in the state constitution "demon·
strates that education is a fundamental constitutional right in this State"); Washakie
County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980) ("In light of the
emphasis which the Wyoming Constitution places on education, there is no room for any
conclusion but that education for the children of Wyoming is a matter of fundamental
interest.").
5
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493; see also Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Financing Adequate Edttra
tional opportunity, 14J.L. & PoL. 483, 484-85 (1998) ("The Broum opinion is both an elo
quent expression of the importance of education and an unreserved reaffirmation of the
state's commitment to providing all children equal educational opportunity."),
6 Since 1976, courts in twenty states have held state education systems to be unconsti·
tutional under state constitution equal protection clauses or education clauses or both,
with some state supreme courts ruling on the validity of the education system multiple
times. See, e.g., Opinion of the justices, No. 338, 624·So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993); Roosevelt
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); DuPree v. Alma Sch.
Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) ("Ser·
rano II"); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977) ("Horton I"); Idaho Schs. for
Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 1993), Exira Cmty. Sch. Dist. v.
State, 512 N.W.2d 787 (Iowa 1994); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186
(Ky. 1989); McDuffyv. Sec'y of the Executive Office ofEduc., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass.l993);
Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), ammded by Helena
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990); Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
1

2
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waii relies on local school districts to some extent,7 judicial declara·
tions of the state's ultimate responsibility for education have catalyzed
dramatic changes in how states ensure their citizens' fundamental
right to education. Indeed, reform inspired by state supreme court
demands for economic equality in education have been as controver
sial8-and as essential to the American ideals of democracy and equal·
ity-as the reform the Brown Court mandated.
New Hampshire and Vermont, two states that have recently re.
sponded to judicial mandates for educational reform,9 are fascinating
case studies of the controversies surrounding education finance re·
form, particularly when compared to one another. Looking at policy
and results in these two states in tandem is productive for three rea·
sons. First, both states implemented reform during approximately the
same time frame (1997 to 1999) and with the same information availa·
ble to each in terms of the experiences of and lessons to be learned
from other states. Second, because both states are overwhelmingly
white and therefore racially homogenous, the aspect of race·based in·
equality is largely eliminated from the equation, allowing for the isola·
tion of economic inequality.10 Third, because both states are
comparable in their population profiles-largely rural with smaller,
metropolitan centers11-aspects of inequality associated with popula·
Governor, 635 A2d 1375 (N.H. 1993); Abbott ex rd. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A2d 359 (NJ.
1990) ("Abbott I"); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No.1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994);
DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851
S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tc."1989); Brigham v. State, 692 A2d 384 {Vt. 1997); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d
71 (Wash. 1978); Pauleyv. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979); Washakie County Sch. Dist.
No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
7 See Robinson, supra note 5, at 483 n.4.
8
E.g., Editorial, The Fzght for a Sound Education, N.Y. TIMES, SepL 11, 2000, at A24
(arguing that state court rulings demanding education reform have "re•;ealed a disturbing
hypocrisy among state officials, who trumpet the need for high standards but have tended
to defend mediocrity and inequality in court when their systems are challenged").
9
SeeClaremontSch. Dist. v. Governor, 703A2d 1353 (N.H.l997) ("Claremont II");
Brigham v. State, 692 A2d 384 (Vt. 1997).
10 In 1995, both New Hampshire and Vermont, along \~ith l\fuine, had nonwhite,
non-Hispanic populations of 2%, the lowest among all states, and Hispanic populations of
1%, as low as any state. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDt:c. STAnsncs, U.S. DEP'T OF Encc., ST,\TE
INDICATORS IN EDUCATION 1997, at 35 (1997).
11 The United States Census Bureau lists greater Burlington, Vermont as a New En.
gland County Metropolitan Area with a 1998 population of 154,442. U.S. CE."'sus Bun£<\U,
NEw ENGLAND CoUNIY METRoPOLITAN AREA AND Ca'TRAL Criv PoPUL:\TION Esn!>L\TES
(1999), at http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/metro-city/ma9S.09.txt (reo.ised
May 15, 2000) [hereinafter NEw ENGLAND CoUNIY METRoPOLITA.~ AREA PoPuu.nos Esn.
MATES]. This accounts for 26% of Vermont's total population in 1998. U.S. CE.-..sus Be.
REAU, STATE PoPULATION EsnMATES AND DEMOGRAPHIC Co~lPOli."E.'"TS OF PoPL!l.ATION
CHANGE (1999), at http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/state/st·99-l.txt (re
leased Dec. 29, 1999) [hereinafter STATE PoPULATION EsTIMATES] (reporting Vermont's
population in 1998 as 590,579). The Census Bureau lists four cities in New Hampshire
:Manchester, Nashua, Portsmouth, and Rochester-as part of the greater Boston, New En-
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tion distribution also do not distort the picture. In sum, these states
provide a unique and valuable controlled "laboratory" environment in
which to examine education finance reform.
In response to the mandates of their respective state supreme
courts, these tiny New England states are now attempting to dismantle
their own version of segregation-of the "haves" from the "have
nots"12-by undertaking bold reform. Although both states under
took this reform by converting some local property tax to statewide
property tax and equally distributing the revenue to pupils statewide,
the states' approaches differ in significant respects. 13 It is because of
these differences that comparison of these othenvise nearly mirror
image states is fruitful. The major point of contrast is in the states'
prioritization of equity among pupils in terms of spending, versus ade
quacy of education in terms of quality. Vermont's approach is equity
driven,14 '\vith financial penalties, called recapture, imposed on any
school district that raises money in order to allot funds to education
beyond the state'\vide per-pupil amount. 15 Significant protest has re
sulted. Declaring the "Robin Hood" tactics of diverting revenues from
wealthy districts to poorer districts to be unconstitutional in and of
themselves, many Vermonters found the scheme to be offensive to
traditional Yankee values of individualism and local control. 16 By con
trast, New Hampshire's approach is adequacy-driven. New Hampshire
calculates a minimum state subsidy deemed "adequate" but does not
obstruct the efforts of local districts to raise funds in excess of that
amount. 17
This Note proposes that implementation of a state'\vide property
tax in Vermont and New Hampshire is a progressive step toward
equality in education and fairness in taxation. This Note further ar
gues that limiting the spending in wealthier districts, as Vermont has
done, is a necessary component of equity-driven reform. However,
this Note cautions that the increased per-pupil expenditure generated
by Vermont's equity-conscious system does not ensure that the system
will provide adequacy. Ultimately, this Note concludes that any state
gland County Metropolitan Area. Their respective 1998 populations of 102,524, 82,169,
25,388, and 27,869, NEw ENGLAND CoUNIY METROPOUTAN AREA PoPUlATION EsTIMATES,
supra, account for 20% of New Hampshire's 1998 population, STATE Poi'UIATION Esn.
MATES, supra (reporting New Hampshire's population in 1998 as 1,185,823).
12 Carey Goldberg, School Tax Law Splits 'Haves' and 'Have Nots,' N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,
1997, at A34.
13 See infra Part III.
14 See infra Part III.B.l.
15 See infra Part III.B.1 (b).
16 See Burkett, supra note 3, at 43; Tamala M. Edwards, Revolt of the Gentry: In Vennont a
New Law Meant to Equalize Public School Funding Has Set Off a Ferocious Class War, TtM£, June
15, 1998, at 34; Goldberg, supra note 12, at A34.
17 See infra Part IliA
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looking to reform education finance in the name of fairness, includ
ing New Hampshire and Vermont, should look to eA-pand revenue
sources in order to arrive at per-pupil eA-penditures that will ensure
equity and adequacy.
This Note also examines how New Hampshire and Vermont
could benefit from education finance legislation undertaken in sister
states, which serve as models to states undertaking education reform
legislation. 18 This Note further explores how examination of the ex
periences of other states' reform efforts helps to build on and contex
tualize the experiences of Vermont and New Hampshire. For
example, Texas has experimented with more publicly acceptable alter
natives to recapture19 that generate the same financial effects sought
by reform in New Hampshire and Vermont Accountability and as
sessment measures such as those in Kentucky2 0 and Massachusetts21
also provide valuable lessons for New Hampshire and Vermont
Part I of this Note describes how school districts with low property
tax bases, which consequently must tax at higher rates to generate as
much revenue as districts with more property wealth, have brought
equal protection or education clause claims in state courts. This sec
tion also describes the history of education litigation in New Hamp
shire and Vermont, as well as the New Hampshire Supreme Court's
decision to overturn the state's education finance system on the basis
18 Education finance reform is a topic \isited and continuously rC\isited in all states.
Many state legislatures have pending or recently enacted legislation affecting the genera
tion and distribution of education funds. Su, e.g., Act of Apr. 10, 2000, 2000 Colo. Legis.
Serv. ch. 107_ (Vvest 2000) (providing for new assessment plan under which the state re
views schools failing to meet state standards and may recommend district reorganization,
curriculum reform, and reallocation of funds); A Plus Education Reform Act, 2000 Ga.
Laws 685 (proposing, among comprehensive reform, adjustment to the equalized )ield
formula); Act of May 25, 2000, 2000 Mont. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 11 (proposing to reduce
local property taxes by increasing state funding for education); H.B. 1, 1999 Leg., I 40th
Gen. Assem. 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 1999) (proposing to distribute $17.5 million dollars to
enable school districts to reduce property ta.xes).
Furthermore, education finance continues to be a political issue in many states. E.g.,
Randy Ludlow, Teachers Union: Revamp Property Tax Ensure Qualil)', 1\foom:j' SaJS, C!xc:.-:.:An
Posr, Aug. 30, 2000, auailahle at 2000 WL 23839257 (reporting teachers union president's
call for the Ohio state legislature to enact a state\\ide property ta.x}; Stephen Ohlemacher,
Gauenwr Dovhts Schools Can Share Taxes on Business, C~'EI.M'D PL\IN DE.UER, Aug. 26, 2000,
auailahle at 2000 WL 5162367 (reporting Ohio governor's disfavor of a state\\ide property
tax}. Even in states that have enacted a statenide property ta.x to support education to
some degree, debate continues over its magnitude and implementation. E.g., Editorial,
Daley Talks Property Tax Reform, CHI. Trus.,July 24, 2000, at 14, available at 2000 WL 3688641
(noting Chicago mayor's attempt at statewide property ta.x reform);Jim Sullinger, Musil Ad
Steps Up Attack on Kline RadW Spot Deals with School Funding, K~"· Cnv STAR. july 15, 2000, at
B1, auailahle at 2000 WL 7738054 (reporting on the race between Kansas Republican con
gressional candidates and their disagreement over state\\ide property ta.x rate).

20

See infra Part II.A.4.
See infra Part II.B.l.

21

See infra Pan II.B.2.

19
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of the New Hampshire Constitution's education clause22 and the Ver
mont Supreme Court's invalidation of that state's system on the basis
of the Vermont Constitution's equal protection clause. 23 Part II de
scribes and evaluates various components of legislative remedies im
plemented in other states, including the equity-based remedies in
states like Texas and California and adequacy-based remedies in states
like Kentucky and Massachusetts. Part III describes and compares re
form efforts in New Hampshire and Vermont. Part IV makes sugges
tions for further reform based on the experiences of Vermont, New
Hampshire, and other states.
I
EDUCATION FINANCE LITIGATION

To understand the national trends in education finance reform,
one must examine the litigation that has driven it. This Part examines
the origins of education finance litigation, first in federal courts and
then in state courts. Next, it considers state court claims brought
under the equal protection clauses of state constitutions. Then, it
contrasts these claims ·with state court claims brought under education
clauses of state constitutions. Finally, it provides background on edu
cation reform litigation in New Hampshire and Vermont specifically.
A

Early Federal and State Court Litigation

Litigation surrounding the adequacy and equality of education
and education finance began with the stirring words of Chief Justice
Warren in Brown v. Board of Education:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. . . . It is the very foundation of good citizen
ship. . . . [I] t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected
to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it,
is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.2 4

With this statement, the Court seemingly opened the door for plain
tiffs to challenge the constitutionality of their state education finance
systems by objecting to disparities in educational opportunity.25 How
ever, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,26 the first
22 See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A2d 1353 (N.H. 1997)
23 See Brigham v. State, 692 A2d 384 (Vt. 1997).
24

347

("Claremont II").

u.s. 483, 493 (1954).

25 SeeJay P. Heubert, Six Law-Driven School Reforms: Developments, Lessons, and Prospects,
in LAw AND ScHOOL REFoRM:

S1x STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUALI'Ii'

1, 2

Uay P. Heubert ed., 1999).
26
411 U.S. 1 (1973). The plaintiff school district challenged Texas's adequacy-based
system of funding education, which consisted of a guaranteed minimum amount of rc•
sources according to the number of students in the district. See id. at 45. The state contrib-
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challenge to a state's education finance system to reach the U.S. Su
preme Court, a five-to-four majority closed the doors of federal court
houses to plaintiffs seeking to reform state education finance systems.
After deciding that education is not a fundamental right27 and that
the petitioner school district with a low property-tax base was not a
suspect class based on the factor of "wealth,"28 the Court denied that
the plaintiff's claim warranted strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.29
Following Rodriguez, plaintiffs in education finance reform litiga
tion had no choice but to assert their claims under state constitutions.
Two early cases, Serrano v. Pries~0 and Robinson v. Cahill,s1 led the sec
ond wave of education finance litigation.52 In both cases, state su
preme courts overturned state education finance plans that relied
heavily on property taxes, but did so on very different grounds from

each other. The California Supreme Court in Serrano II struck down
the system based on the equal protection clause of the California Con
stitution,33 holding both that education is a fundamental right and
that poor school districts are a suspect classification.5 4 In contrast, the
uted 80% of this amount and required districts to raise property ta.'l\es to supply the
remainder, while allowing districts to supplement this amount \\ith additional property ta.x
revenue. Id. at 9-10, 46. Typical of most plaintiffs in school finance litigation, the
Edgewood school district had a low property base, so that even when appl)ing high ta.x
rates, it could only generate a fraction of the funds that wealthier districts could supply
using lower tax rates. CJ. id. at 46 (noting that, under the then<WTCnt Te.xas system,
"[t]he greatest interdistrict disparities .•• are attributable to differences in the amount of
assessable property available within any district" and that "[t]hose districts that have more
property, or more valuable property, have a greater capability for supplementing state
funds").
27 Id. at 35-37. The Court rejected the petitioner's claim that education is a funda
mental right because it effectuates the First Amendment right to free speech and the right
to make an informed vote. Id. The Court e.\.-plained that: "we have never presumed to
possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizeruy the most t./fuln!e
speech or the most informed electoral choice." I d. at 36.
28 See id. at 28 (characterizing the plaintiffs as a "large, diverse, and amorphous class,
unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to hm·e less taxable
wealth than other districts"). The Court denied that such a class met requirements for
strict scrutiny:
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of
the indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled nith such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command e.'l\traordin:uy pro
tection from the majoritarian political process.
I d.
29 Id. at 37-39.
30 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) ("Serrano 1"). TI1is case, decided prior to Roclrigua., was
reaffirmed in Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) ("Serrano 11").
31
303 A.2d 273 (NJ. 1973).
32
Deborah A. Verstegen, The Jllew lVave of School Finance Litigation, PHI DELTA MPP.\.~,
Nov. 1994, at 243, 244.
33
CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § 7.
34 Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 951.
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New Jersey Supreme Court in IWbinson based its holding on the state
constimtion's education clause, which requires a 11 thorough and effi
cient system of free public schools."35 On this basis, the court held
that the state failed to satisfy its constitutional duty of providing an
adequate public education system. 36 Taken together, Serrano II and
IWbinson demonstrate (1) that education finance litigation can suc
ceed in state courts; and (2) that courts may evaluate education fund
ing systems on two different grounds-adequacy and equity.
B. Litigation Based on Equal Protection Claims
Most post-Serrano II state equal protection litigation focused on
correcting inequality in education resulting from the combination of
state and local tax systems funding state public education systems. 3 7
Whereas California continued to strictly scrutinize its funding system
in Serrano III,38 courts in Wyoming,39 Connecticut,40 Arkansas,41 Ala
bama,42 North Dakota,43 and Vermont44 have used varying levels of
35 NJ. CoNST. art. VIII, § 4, cl. 1.
36 Robinson, 303 A3d at 295. Specifically, the court applied a balancing test to the
state school finance system. See id. at 282. The benefits of local control the state achieved
by relying heavily on the local property tax system weighed heavily in favor of its position.
See id. at 286. But on the plaintiff's side, the court interpreted the constitutional mandate
for a "thorough and efficient system of free public schools" as the functional equivalent of
equal educational opportunity. The court declared the current property tax system uncon•
stitutional because it contained "no apparent relation to the ,mandate for equal educa·
tional opportunity." ld. at 296.
37
See julie K Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MtcH. J.L.
REFoRM 493, 498-500 (1995).
38 See Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 615 (Ct. App. 1986) ("Serrano III") (up
holding California's revised system under equal protection strict scrutiny and calling ex·
isting disparities in per-pupil spending "both insignificant and justified by legitimate state
interests").
39 See, e.g., Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 340 (Wyo.
1980) (invalidating Wyoming's education finance system as violative of both the equal pro
tection clause and the education clause of the Wyoming Constitution).
40 See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977) ("Horton I") ("[I]n
Connecticut the right to education is so basic and fundamental that any infringement of
that right must be strictly scrutinized.").
41
See, e.g., DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983) (determin·
ing that the right to equal educational opportunity is "basic to our society" and that the tax
system bore "no rational relationship to the educational needs of the individual districts,
[but rather that the system] is determined primarily by the tax base of each district").
42
See, e.g., Opinion of the justices, No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 156 (Ala. 1993) (holding
that "the Alabama system of public schools fails to provide plaintiffs the equal protection of
the laws under any standard of equal protection review").
43 See, e.g., Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 259 (N.D. 1994)
(finding that the property tax-based system did not deprive plaintiffs of their fundamental
right to education and using intermediate scrutiny to find the system "not necessarily re•
lated to any aspect of educational needs" and that it "fails to bear a close correspondence
either to the constitutional mandate to provide an equal educational opportunity, or to the
legislative goal of 'support[ing] elementary and secondary education in this state from
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scrutiny to overturn education finance system on equal protection
grounds.
Courts examining education finance systems on equal protection
grounds must determine what component of the system to equalize.
Commonly, equal protection plaintiffs seek to equalize a system's "in
puts," or general per-pupil spending, regardless of special needs.45
Thus, plaintiffs bringing equal protection claims urge courts to re
quire districts to tax property at similar rates and to generate similar
amounts of per-student revenue.
A majority of courts, however, have been reluctant to strike down
entire education funding systems on the basis of inequity alone and
have used both equal protection and education clauses of state consti
tutions to invalidate education finance systems.46 Additionally, some
courts have upheld education finance systems by rejecting interpreta
tions of equal protection clauses that mandate absolute equality in ed
ucation.47 Other courts have determined that equal protection

C£.''·

state funds based on the educational cost per [pupil).'" (quoting N.D.
CoDE § 1540.1-06(1) (1993))).
44 See Brigham v. State, 692 A2d 384, 396 (VL 1997) (finding the state education
finance system capricious even under the rational basis test).
45
See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 608 (CL App. 1986) (MSerrano ill").
46 See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 805, 814 (Ariz.
1994) (noting that "[f]unding mechanisms that prO\ide sufficient funds to educate chil
dren substantially on equal terms tend to satisfy the general and uniform requirement"
and holding that Arizona's then-current education finance system did Knot satisf}· the con
stitutional mandate of a general and uniform school system"); Abbott ex rtl Abbott \'.
Burke, 643 A2d 575, 58().81 (NJ. 1994) (invalidating education finance system that f."liled
to provide additional funding to special-needs districts on the grounds that it failed to
meet the state education clause mandate for a thorough and efficient education); PaulC)'\'.
Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (using both the equal protection clause and the
education clause of the "'est Vrrginia Constitution to overturn state education finance sys·
tem largely relying on local property ta.x revenues); sa also Robert M.Jensen, Advancing
Education Through Education Clauses of State Constitutions, BYU Eot:c. & L.J., Spring 1997, at
1, 12-14 (noting the difficulties confronting plaintiffs challenging systems on equality
grounds alone).
47 See, e.g., Lujan v. State Bd. ofEduc., 649 P.2d 1005, 1022 (Colo. 1982) (MThe Colo
rado Constitution does not forbid disparities in wealth, nor does it forbid persons residing
in one district from ta.xing thetnselves at a rate higher than persons in another district.");
Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 653 (Idaho 1975) ("Neither equal protection, nor
[the state constitution education clause], require that the public schools be financed so
that equal amounts are C.'\:pended per pupil ....");Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 353
(Neb. 1993) (upholding summaryjudgment against equal protection plaintiffs that alleged
disparity in funding but not inadequacy in education); Britt v. State Bd. of Educ., 357
S.E.2d 432, 436 (N.C. 1987) (refusing to interpret the state constitutional mandate that
"equal opportunities shall be provided for all students" as prO\iding a fundamental right to
substantially equal funding (quoting N.C. Co:s:sr. art. IX,§ 2, cl. 1)); Danson\'. Casey, 399
A2d 360, 366-67 (Pa. 1979) {finding no requirement in the Pennsylmnia Constitution's
equal protection clause that educational offerings be uniform).
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clauses of state constitutions do not require equality in educational
opportunities.48
C.

Litigation Based on Education Clauses in State Constitutions

Unlike the federal Constitution, every state constitution contains
an education clause. However, these clauses vary in language from
state to state.49 Over half of the education clauses in state constitu
tions mandate a threshold level of educational quality. 50 Several of
these clauses use more expansive qualitative language to prioritize ed
ucation51 or to further specify the standard the state must meet. Some
clauses specifically identify subjects on which the state education sys
tem should focus. 5 2 Fifteen state constitutions contain clauses empha
sizing the purpose and importance of education.5s Some
constitutions also include specific provisions for nondiscrimination,
accessibility, and uniformity. 54
48 McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 168 (Ga. 1981) (recognizing that "[i]n tenns
of equalization the system is a poor one" but upholding it against equal protection chal·
lenge); Bd. ofEduc., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359,363 (N.Y.
1982) (upholding the school finance system even after admitting it had "significant inc·
qualities"); Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Todayv. Cuomo, 578 N.Y.S.2d 969,973-76 (Sup.
Ct. 1991) (recognizing that the plaintiffs had "vividly demonstrated the disparities in ex·
penditures per pupil between property-wealthy and property-poor districts" but rejecting
their claim for failure to show "gross and glaring inadequacy" in the quality of education
provided), afj'd as modifzed, 655 N.E. 2d 647 (N.Y. 1995); Coalition for Equitable Sch. Fund·
ing v. State, 811 P.2d 116, 117 n.2, 121-22 (Or. 1991) (holding that clause of the state
constitution requiring "uniform" public schools countenances disparities between districts
with respect to financial benefits and tax burdens).
49
See Daniel D. McClain, Education, Developments in State Ccmstitutional Law: 1994, 26
RUTGERS LJ. 1064, 1064 n.2 (1995).
50 See Jensen, supra note 46, at 4. Examples of state constitution education clauses
with quality-defining language include "'efficient system of high quality,' 'efficient,' 'gen·
eral and efficient,' 'thorough and efficient,' 'general and uniform,' 'thorough and uni·
form,' 'general, uniform, and thorough,' 'complete and uniform,' 'liberal,' 'basic,'
'competent,' and 'suitable.'" Id. at 4-5 (footnotes omitted). "Fifteen states have no quality
statement at all, establishing a commitment only in terms of the existence of a system
without any given standard." Id. at 5.
51 See id. at 5. The Washington Constitution places the education duty above all other
duties. Id. The Illinois, Georgia, Louisiana, and Montana Constitutions define the educa·
tion duty as a fundamental goal to provide citizens with education development to the
limits of their capacities. Id. at 5-6.
52 Id. at 6. Some states focus on intellectual, vocational, and scientific improvement,
while others focus on "cultural education," and still others on "moral or religious cduca·
tion." Id. at 6-7.
53 See id. at 7. For example, North Dakota's education clause counsels that, "'[a] high
degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity, and morality on the part of every voter in a
government by the people'" is necessary "'to insure the continuance of that government
and the prosperity and happiness of the people,"' and mandates that "'the legislative as
sembly shall make provision for the establishment and maintenance of a system of public
schools.'" Id. (quoting N.D. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 1).
54
See id. at 8 & n.42.
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Education Clauses as a Basis for bw.dequacy Claims

As an alternative to, or, more commonly, in addition to equal
protection-based claims, challengers to state education finance sys
tems use education clauses to assert that the state education system is
inadequate.55
Following Robinson, in cases based on state education clauses,
courts have expounded on the characteristics of adequacy necessary
to satisfy their state constitutional requirements. In the landmark
1989 case Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 5 6 the Kentud"}' Su
preme Court delineated seven factors governing educational
adequacy:
[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide
each and every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i)
sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students
to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) suffi
cient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable
the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understand
ing of governmental processes to enable the student to understand
the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv)
sufficient seU:knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and
physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each
student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi)
sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either ac
ademic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and
pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic

or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete fa55
See supra note 46 and accompanying te.xt. Adequacy arguments ha\·e been success
ful as the sole basis for challenges in seven cases in which state supreme courts found the
state education funding system to be inadequate under education clause standards. Su
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989) (declaring that
"Kentucky's entire S)'Siem of common schools is unconstitutional" because "the General As
sembly of the Commonwealth has failed to establish an efficient system of common
schools"); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 527-28, 55556 (Mass. 1993) (holding that the state government had failed to fulfill its state constitu
tional duty to "cherish" the state public schools); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635
A2d 1375, 1378-81 (N.H. 1993) ("Claremont I") (interpreting the New Hampshire Consti
tution's education clause to impose a duty on the legislature to "cherish" public schools);
DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997) (in\'alidating the state system of educa
tion finance under the Ohio Constitution's education clause, which mandates a "thorough
and efficient system of common schools throughout the state"), darijitd lrj DeRolph v.
State, 699 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1998); Abbe\ille County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535,540
(S.C. 1999) ("\V'e hold today that the South Carolina Constitution's education clause re
quires the General Assembly to provide the opportunity for each child to receive a mini
mally adequate education."); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1. v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 92 (Wash. 1978)
(holding that "all children residing within the State's borders have a 'right' to be amply
provided with an education," that this right is "constitutionally paramount," and "must be
achieved through a 'general and uniform system of public schools'" (quoting WASH.
CoNsr. art. IX.§ 2)).
56 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
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vorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics
or in the job market.57
Though state constitutions differ significantly in their education stan·
dard-setting language, courts' adequacy-based decisions have found
the Rose adequacy factors relevant to their determinations, regardless
of the exact language of the education clause in question.58

2. Education Clauses as a Basis for Claims of Inequity
State constitution education clauses also provide the basis for
claims of inequity within education finance systems.59 In some cases,
the language in the state constitution's education clause also served as
the basis for claims identical to those brought under state equal pro
tection clauses. For example, the Montana constitution's education
clause, which specifically states that "[e]quality of educational oppor
tunity is guaranteed to every person of the state," 60 provided the basis
for the state supreme court to hold that "spending disparities among
the State's school districts translate into a denial of equality of educa
tional opportunity."61 On the other hand, when language in the edu
cation clause fails to allude specifically to an equality mandate, courts
have been reluctant to imply this language. 62
The largest group of successful education finance reform plain
tiffs are those who brought "hybrid" claims under both an equal pro
tection clause (demanding horizontal equity) and an education clause
(demanding adequacy). 63 In contrast, the least successful plaintiffs
are those who attempted to substitute an education clause's demand
for "uniformity" for the mandate of an equal protection clause. Hy57

Id. at 212.

See, e.g., McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554; Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor 703 A.2d
1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) ("Claremont II").
59 For example, the Texas Supreme Court initially interpreted its constitution's re
quirement that the state produce an "efficient" system of education as a demand for equity.
See Edgewood lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391,397 (Tex. 1989) ("Edgewood 1"),
Later, the court decided that efficiency mandated minimum adequacy. Edgewood Indcp.
Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 893 S.W.2d 450, 470 (Tex. 1995) ("Edgewood IV").
60 MoNT. CoNST. art X, § 1.
61
Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No.1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989).
62 E.g., Scottv. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138,142 (Va.1994) (concluding that "no
where does the [Virginia] Constitution require equal, or substantially equal, funding or
programs among and within the Commonwealth's school divisions," after noting the state
constitution admonishes government to avail itself of its peoples' talents "'by assuring op
portunity for [the peoples'] fullest development by an effective system of education
throughout the Commonwealth.'" (quoting VA. CoNST. art. I, § 15 (alterations in the
original))).
63 Jensen, supra note 46, at 27; see also cases cited supra note 48 (invalidating educa
tion finance systems on equal protection grounds). But see Jenkins v. Leininger, 659
N.E.2d 1366 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (rejecting plaintiffs' challenge to Illinois's education sys
tem based on the education and equal protection clauses of the state constitution and the
parental right to oversee a child's welfare).
58
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brid claims seek to establish equality as "just one measure of adequacy
to advance the quality of education. "64 Hybrid claims are successful
due to the synergistic effect of equity and adequacy arguments in one
suit. Allegations of an education system's inadequacy bolster a plain
tiffs demands for equity in taxing and spending. 6s Furthermore, al

leging inequality enables a plaintiff to present evidence of disparate
funding in support of inadequacy claims.66

D. Education Finance Reform Litigation in New Hampshire and
Vermont
1.

New Hampshire's Claremont Litigation

New Hampshire school districts had been aware of the education
funding disparities since the 1970s, but attempts to initiate litigation
were unsuccessful until the 1990s.67 Catalyzed by the loss of accredita
tion at Stevens High School in Claremont, New Hampshire,63 and the
state's apparent failure to distribute state aid in the manner to which
it had committed,69 a coalition of plaintiffs-including five property
poor school districts70-filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive
relief in Merrimack County Superior Court on June 12, 1991.71 The
plaintiffs alleged that (1) the inequitable and inadequate distribution
of state education funds violated the education clause of the New
64

Jensen, supra note 46, at 27 (internal quotation marks omitted).

65
66

Id.
Id.

67 Interview with Andru VolinsJ...')', Partner, Stein, VolinsJ...1•, and Callahan, Concord,
NH, lead counsel for Claremont plaintiffs, in Concord, N.H. (August 12, 1999). In one early
case, ]esseman v. State, No. 83-371 (N.H. 1982), plaintiff school districts alleged that the
state education finance system violated the education clause of the New Hampshire Consti
tution by failing to equitably distribute education resources. Prowl ural History of the Clare
moot Lawsuit, in WISS INsr. FOR Pus. Poucv, THE CL·\REMONT Eot:cAnos L-\WSUIT:
BRIDGING nm EDUCATION DMDE (1998}, at http://\\1W<.wissinsLorg (last \isited Aug. 31,
2000) (on IDe with author) [hereinafter, Prowlural History]. The plaintiffs ultimately
dropped the suit when the 1985 Augenblick Bill in the New Hampshire legislature
amended the manner in which the state distributed education resources. See id.
68 Interview with Andru VolinsJ...')', supra note 67; see also Royal Ford, 5 Distn"cls Sue
N.H., Say Students Are Short-Changed, BoSToN GLOBE, June 14, 1991, at 1 (describing the
beginning of the Claremont litigation).
69 In 1983, education finance e.xpertjohn Augenblick reported to the New Hamp
shire House and Senate education committees on the funding disparities in New Hamp
shire and made recommendations for change. See Prowlural Kutory, supra note 67. This
report resulted in the 1985 passage of the Augenblick Bill, see id., which is now codified as
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.l98:29 (1989) (amended 1999). The codification of the "Augenblick
Formula" for distribution of "Foundation Aid" to school districts included an equalization
factor based on districts' property wealth, income wealth, and tax effort &z Procedural
History, supra note 67. However, the state never fully funded districts under the Augenblick
Formula, which, among other things, prompted the Claremont litigation. Id.
70 See Ford, supra note 68, at 14 ("Named as petitioners in the New Hampshire suit are
school districts in Claremont, Franklin, Lisbon, Pittsfield and Allentown •.• :).
71 Procedural History•, supra note 67.
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Hampshire Constitution;72 and (2) the current system's reliance on
property taxes to finance public schools exceeded the state's constitu
tional tax powers. 73 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that taxpayers in
property-poor districts paid a significantly higher property tax rate, yet
their tax efforts raised less money per pupil than those in property
rich districts. 74 The plaintiffs argued that "[t]he amount of state fund
ing-less than eight percent of the total spent on public education
[was] insufficient to allow property poor districts to provide an ade
quate education to their children or to allow the districts to make up
for the deficiencies in their property values. "75 Finding that the lan
guage of the education clause of the New Hampshire Constitution,
which requires the legislature to "cherish public schools," imposed no
duty on the state to support public schools,Judge Manias of the Supe
rior Court granted the state's motion to dismiss on August 13, 1992,76
The school districts subsequently appealed to the New Hampshire Su
preme Court. 77
Relying on dictionaries in existence at the time of the New
Hampshire Constitution's inception,78 the supreme court determined
that the duty to cherish education is not "merely a statement of aspira
tion" and that "[t]he language commands, in no uncertain terms, that
72 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1377 (N.H. 1993) ("Claremont
1"). The education clause reads:
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community, being
essential to the preservation of a free government; and spreading the op
portunities and advantages of education through the various parts of the
country, being highly conducive to promote this end; it shall be the duty of
the legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of this government, to
cherish the interest of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and
public schools, to encourage private and public institutions, rewards, and
immunities for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce,
trades, manufactures, and natural history of the country, to countenance
and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence, public
and private charity, industry and economy, honesty and punctuality, sincer·
ity, sobriety, and all social affections, and generous sentiments, among the
people.
N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83.
73
Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1377. The state constitution lists among the duties of the
legislature the power to "impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates,
and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and residents within, the said state." N.H. CoN!.&'.
pt. II, art. 5. Plaintiffs argued that when provision of education is the duty of the state,
taxes used to fund education must be proportional and reasonable. When taxpayers in
property-poor districts pay a significantly higher property tax rate than taxpayers in prop
erty-rich districts, yet by these tax efforts raise less money per pupil, the system depends on
disproportional and unreasonable assessment. See Procedural Histary, supra note 67.
74 See Procedural History, supra note 67.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78
Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1378 (relying on a 1780 dictionary defining "duty" as
"[t]hat to which a man is by any natural or legal obligation bound" and "cherish" as "[t]o
support, to shelter, to nurse up" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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the State provide an education to all its citizens and that it support all
public schools. "79 The court also looked to the decision of the Massa
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court in McDuffy v. Secretary of tile Executive
O.ffice of Education,80 which construed the similarly worded education
clause of the Massachusetts Constitution as providing such an affirma
tive duty.81 Concluding that the right to a free public education is "at
the very least an important, substantive right,"82 the supreme court
remanded the case to the superior court for a determination of
whether New Hampshire's education finance system adequately dis
charged this duty.ss
On remand, Judge Manias again ruled in favor of the state.81 In a
three-part analysis, the lower court adopted the state's restrictive defi
nition of educational adequacy,85 determined that the current educa

tion finance system met that definition of adequacy,8G and concluded
that the state constitution did not mandate equitability and adequacy
of education.87 As for the claim that the school property tax system
79

/d.

so 615 N.E.2d 516 {Mass. 1993). The New Hampshire Supreme Court was also com
fortable looking to Massachusetts for precedent because of the states' shared colonial his
tory and the similarities in language in their education clauses. Sa Clamnant I. 635 A.2d at
1378.
81
See Claremont I. 635 A.2d at 1378, 1381.
82 Id. at 1381.
83 Id. at 1382.
84 Procedural History, supra note 67.
85 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1357 (N.H. 1997) (•Claremont
IT'). The State Board of Education developed this definition, which pro\ided that "[a]n
adequate public elementary and secondary education in New Hampshire is one which pro
vides each educable child with an opportunity to acquire the knowledge and learning nec
essary to participate intelligently in the American political, economic, and social system of
free government." Id. By contrast, the plaintiff's proposed definition of educational ad~
quacy, prepared by an education expert, required the state to take responsibility for pro
viding sufficient resources to recognize the special needs of gifted and at·risk students, to
manage schools efficiently, and to enable students to achieve reasonable educational goals.
Procedural History, supra note 67.
86 Procedural History, supra note 67. Evidence presented to the court matched the fi\·e
plaintiff districts to "comparison districts" of equal population. I d. In the district of Frank
lin, the equalized property valuation per student in 1993 was $183,626, compared to the
district of Gilford, with a property valuation per student of $536,761. Jd. E\·en though
Franklin's 1993-94 tax rate was higher than Gilford's by $3.93 per $1000 of property \'alue,
Gilford was able to raise $2901 more per student than Franklin. Jd. E\·en more dranmtic is
the discrepancy between plaintiff district of Pittsfield and its comparison district of
Moultonborough. See id. In 1993, Moultonborough, on Lake Winncpesaukce, had an
equalized property value per student of $1,319,221, compared to Pittsfield's $120,792. Jd.
Despite Pittsfield's property tax rate of $25.32 per $1000 of property, it was able to raise
only $4493 per student, while Moultonborough could tax at a rate of $5.48 per $1000 of
property value and raise $6426 per student. The trial court acknowledged the discrepancy,
but discredited it by stating that "ta.x rate, standing alone, is not an accurate measure of ta.x
burden; other factors such as income level partially determine the 'burden' the ta.x actually
imposes." ld.
87 ld. Judge Manias pointed out that the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Claremont
I made no specific reference to adequacy or equality required under the state constitution.
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violated the "proportional and reasonable" requirement of the taxa~
tion clause, the court determined that local property taxes are munici~
pal taxes, not state taxes, and thus immune from the requirement. 88
On second appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court again
overturned the lower court.89 First, the court invalidated the tax sys~
tern, reasoning that because education is a nondelegable state duty,
taxes raised in support of education are state taxes, not municipal
taxes, and therefore must be "'equal in valuation and uniform in
rate'" to comply with the taxation dause. 90 Second, the court de~

dared that students have a fundamental right to a constitutionally ad·
equate education91 and consequently employed strict judicial
scrutiny.92 In concluding that the current education finance system
did not meet adequacy standards, the supreme court rejected the trial
court's definition of adequacy, adopting instead the seven Rose factors
for determining adequacy.93 While acknowledging some value in 1~
cal control over education, the court asserted that "the State cannot
use local control as a justification for allowing the existence of educa~
tiona! services below the level of constitutional adequacy." 94 The
court gave the state legislature a deadline of Aprill, 1999, to develop
a tax scheme for funding education that would equalize property valu~
ation and tax rates statewide. 95

Id. The district court rejected equal protection claims, citing lack of a fundamental right
and suspect classification. Id. It thus applied "middle tier" scrutiny to the education fl.
nance system, and found it to be "a reasonable, not arbitrary classification" with a "fair and
substantial relationship to the object of the legislation." I d. The district court maintained
that the petitioners did not demonstrate that the current funding system of local property
tax plus foundation aid resulted in inadequate educational opportunity. See id.
88 Id.
89 Claremont Sch. Dist v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997) ("Claremont II").
90 Id. at 1355 (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 379 A.2d 782, 786 (N.H. 1977)). New
Hampshire became the first state to hold an education system unconstitutional based on
unequal taxation. DAVID LoNG, NAT'L Om. FOR EDuc. STATISTics, U.S. DEP'T OF EDuc.,
INTRODUCTION TO SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION (1999), at http://www.nces.cd.gov/eclfin/
litigation/Introduction.asp [hereinafter LoNG, INTRODUCTION].
91
Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1358-59. The court pointed out that the education clause
is one of only two places in the entire New Hampshire Constitution where the framers
placed an affirmative duty on the legislature. Id. at 1358.
92 Id. at 1359.
93 Id. at 1359 (defining an adequate education as one that extends beyond "[m]ere
competence" in "reading, writing, and arithmetic" to the "broad exposure to the soclal,
economic, scientific, technological, and political realities of today's society [which] is es
sential for our students to compete, contribute, and flourish in the twenty-first century");
see also text accompanying supra notes 56-57 (discussing the Rose factors).
94 Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1360.
95 Geeta O'Donnell Anand, Who lVins and Who Loses Under N.H. Tax Proposals, WALL
Sr. J.·NEW ENG., Mar. 17, 1999, available at WL-WSJ 5444725.
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In May of 1998, the court denied the state's motion to vacate its
ruling in Claremont II.96 Later that year, the court e::-.-pressed its opin
ion that the legislature's proposed remedy, known as the ABC plan,97
was unconstitutional.98 Meanwhile, conservative legislators unsuccess
fully attempted to introduce a referendum for a constitutional amend
ment that would have nullified the court's decision in Claremont Il.99
In November of 1998, the court denied the state's request for a two
year period in which to comply with Claremont II. 100 In May of 1999,
the court ruled that the state's proposed use of a referendum vote to
enact a tax plan was an unconstitutional delegation of power. 101

2.

Vermont~

Brigham Litigation

In Vermont, disparities in tax effort and education opportunities
among communities, similar to those in its neighboring communities
across the Connecticut River, 102 as well as failed legislative efforts to
reform the education funding system, inspired the American Civil Lib
erties Union of Vermont (ACLU) to seek judicial action. 103 Ver
mont's education finance system was similar to New Hampshire's
prior to Claremont. it consisted of a codified foundation formula, in
96 See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 712 A.2d 612 {N.H. 1998) (wClaremont lll"}
(denying the state's argument that a state statute disqualified the retired judge in the case
because he was over age seventy).
97 The ABC {Advancing Better Classrooms) plan HB 1280.Local, was a proposal to t.a.x
property at a uniform rate, but allowed property-wealthy districts to set their rates lower
than the uniform rate. Opinion of the justices (School Fmancing), 712 A.2d 1080, 1085
(N.H. 1998).
98 Id. at 1087.
99 See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 725 A.2d 648, 650 (N.H. 1998) (wClaremont
IV"). In October 1999, the New Hampshire Senate passed a proposal to amend the New
Hampshire Constitution that would validate the taxation system found unconstitutional in
Claremont II. Constitutional Amendment Con. Res. 26, !56th Leg. (N.H. 1999). However,
as predicted, the proposal died in the state House of Representati\·es. Sre, e.g., Lawmar.m
May Team Up to Get Courts Out of Loop, FoSTER's DAILY DEMOCRAT, Dec. 11, 1999, at 1, 8;
Norma Love, Republican Leaders' Best Slwt at Constitutional Amendment Falls Short, AssoclA-rm
PRESS, Jan. 14, 2000, availahle al WL APWIRES 02:16:00.
100 See Claremont IV; 725 A.2d at 649 {"Absent extraordinary circumstances, delay in
achieving a constitutional system is inexcusable.").
101
See Opinion of the justices (Tax Plan Referendum), 725 A.2d 1082 (N.H. 1999).
102 See Robert Gensburg, Tlze Road to Equal Educational Opportunity for Vennant Schaal
Children, 22 VT. L. REv. 1, 1 (1997). For e.xample, in 1995, the property ta.xes on an
$85,000 home in the ski resort town of Stratton were$17, while the ta.xes on a house of the
same value in the town of Stannard were $2640. /d. at 7. Property \'alues were C\·en dispa
rate as between towns '\ithin the same union school district. See id. Gensburg pro\ides an
additional anecdotal example of how ta.x base disparities lead to disparities in fundamental
education resources: In 1994 the property-poor, high·ta.x school district of Hard1\ick had
to eliminate a first grade remedial reading program because it could not afford to pay its
share of the cost of the largely federally-funded program, while the ncarb)'• property-rich,
ski-resort town of Stowe contemplated an appropriation of $84,000 to repair the tennis
courts at Stowe High SchooL /d. at 2.
103 See id. at 2.
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which state aid supplemented local effort in order to meet a legisla
tively determined, minimum per-pupil expenditure in each district. 104
In March of 1995, a group of students, taxpayers, and two school
districts filed suit against the state, 105 alleging violations of the educa
tion106 and equal protection107 clauses of Vermont's constitution.
Judge Meaker of the Lamoille County Superior Court granted the
State's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that education is not
a fundamental right under the Vermont Constitution and that the
provision the plaintiffs relied upon does not confer a private right of
action. 108 On joint appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court recognized
that its duty was "solely to define the impact of the State Constitution
on educational funding." 109 At the outset, the court determined that
the education funding system in place did not eliminate wealth dispar
ities, but only equalized funding "to a level of a minimally adequate
education program." 110 Assessing the education clause of the Ver
mont Constitution in its historical context, 111 the court concluded
that education is a fundamental obligation of the state, a responsibility
the state may not delegate to municipalities. 112 In the equal protec
tion analysis that followed, the court held that the state's argument
that "local control" justified such a shift of responsibility did not con
stitute a legitimate government purpose underlying the education fi
nance system. 113
104 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 3492-3499 (1989) (repealed 1997, effective 1998).
105 Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997). The principal plaintiff was Amanda
Brigham, an elementary school student in the district of Whiting, Vennont. In 'Whiting,
the property tax base was less than 70% of the state average. See Gensburg, supra note 102,
at 8.
106

VT. CoNsr.

ch. II,§ 68 ("[A] competent number of schools ought to be maintained

in each town unless the general assembly permits other provisions for the convenient in•
struction ofyouth.").
107 VT. CoNST. ch. I, art. 7 ("[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the com•
mon benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community , , ••"); Vr.
CoNST. ch. I, art. 9 ("[E)very member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoy•
ment of life, liberty, and property, and therefore is bound to contribute the member's
proportion towards the expence of that protection ....").
108 Brigham v. State, No. 53-3-95, slip op. at 9-10 (Lamoille County Super. Ct. Oct. 2,
1996).
109 Brigham, 692 A.2d at 386.
110 Id. at 388.
111 I d. at 392-93. The court considered the importance offostering republican values,
or "public virtue," that the framers of the Vermont Constitution considered "a matter liter·
ally affecting the survival of the new Republic" and "'necessary to preserve the blessings of
liberty.'" ld. at 392 (quoting VT. CoNST. of 1777, ch. I, art. 16). That the framers subse·
quently combined the virtue and education clauses into a single section suggests their
equally strong conception of the importance of education. See id. at 393.
112 Id. at 395.
113 The court rejected the state's local control argument, reasoning that "poorer dis
tricts cannot realistically choose to spend more for educational excellence than their prop
erty wealth will allow, no matter how much sacrifice their voters are willing to make. The
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II
LEGISlATIVE REsPONSES TO EDUCATION REFORM DECISIONS •

Professor Molly S. McUsic reminds us that "winning in the court
room is not the same as winning in the classroom,"114 suggesting that
litigation victories are only half the battle for proponents of education
reform. After a court invalidates a state's methods for funding educa
tion, the legislature then must enact a remedy responsive to both judi
cial and public concerns. us
Litigation prompts most modem legislative reform, 116 but
whether plaintiffs base their claims on an education clause or an
equal protection clause does not necessarily dictate the components
of the resulting legislative reform. As mentioned in Part I, claims
based on either or both of these sources can place equity in the re
form spotlight_117
This Part first considers equity-based elements of reform, includ
ing minimum expenditures, spending caps and recapture, consolida
tion of districts and tax bases, and giving districts a choice among
various remedies. The reforms adopted in Connecticut, Arkansas,

California, Wyoming, and Texas exemplify how these elements come
into play. Next, this Part describes adequacy-based elements of re
form, such as those adopted by Kentuck]' and Massachusetts. Lastly,
this Part presents arguments favoring and opposing equity- and ade
quacy-based elements of reform.
A

Equity Elements of Reform

Legislatures responding to courts' equity concerns generally fo
cus on the equalization of funding. 118 Reformers define equity in
three ways. The first, most common type is "horizontal equity," the
current system plainly does not enhance fiscal choice for poorer school districts: !d. at
396.
114 Molly S. McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and Pit
faDs ofSchool Finance Litigation, in l..Aw AND ScHooL REroR.\1: SIX STRAn:GtES FOR PRO~IOTJNG
EDuCATIONAL EQUITY 88, 107 Uay P. Heubert eel., 1999).
115 E.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993) (~Clare
mont I") ("\V"e are confident that the legislature and the Governor \\ill fulfill their respon
sibility with respect to defining the specifics of, and the appropriate means to pro\ide
through public education, the knowledge and learning essential to the presen"3tion of a
free government."); Brigham, 692 A.2d at 398 ("Although the [Vermont] Legislature
should act under the Vermont Constitution to make educational opportunity a\"3ilable on
substantially equal terms, the specific means of discharging this broadly defined duty is
properly left to its discretion.").
116 For an example of litigation-free education reform, see generally Charles Berger,
Equity lVitlwut Adjudication: Kansas School Finance Refonn and tl1e 1992 Schaal Distn"ct Finance
and Quality Peifarmance Act, 27 J.L. & Eouc. 1 (1998) (evaluating education fmance refonn
initiated by the Kansas state legislature which had not been catal)ozed by a court mandate).
117

See supra Part I.C.l-2.

118

See McUsic, supra note 114, at 104.
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theory that per-pupil expenditures should not materially differ be·
tw·een rich districts and poor districts. 119 The second type is "vertical
equity," which evaluates a system's ability to account for differing
needs of school districts with varying populations of special education
students, bilingual students, and gifted and talented students.12o
Closely related to the other types of equity is "fiscal neutrality," which
"requires similar tax efforts and burdens among districts."1 2 1 Thus,
invalidation of an education funding system for lack of equity, under
either an equal protection or education clause, may inspire any of a
number of legislative remedies, including: (1) modification or imple..
mentation of a foundation program to ensure minimum per-student
spending; (2) spending caps and "recapture" provisions that limit the
education spending of property-rich districts; (3) consolidation of tax
bases or school districts; and (4) others means of equalizing tax
bases. 122
1.

"Leveling Up": Minimum Expenditure Requirements

A state that adopts a "leveling up" approach will increase the reve·
nue in districts where education spending is below the state mean. For
example, in Connecticut, the General Assembly responded to Harton
v. Meskill123 by enacting a leveling up approach that contained tvvo
components: a guaranteed tax base grant and a minimum expendi·
ture requirement. 124 Under this approach, districts that demonstrate
an inability to meet minimum expenditure requirements per pupil
qualify for the guaranteed tax base (GTB) grant. 125 The state distrilr
utes the grant under the GTB formula, which takes into account the
district's wealth (measuring real and personal property), the district's
need (measuring the relationship between the district's educational
expenditures and per capita income), and the district's population
(measuring the number of students in the district). 12 6 Because the
formula generates a figure for state aid designed to put the district in
the financial position it would be in if it had the tax base of a desig·
119 See Erin E. Kelly, Note, All Students Are Not Created Equal: The Inequitable Comhir~ati011
of Property-Tax-Based School Finance Systems and Local Contro~ 45 DuKE LJ. 397, 402 (1995),
120 /d.
121 /d.
122 See discussion infra Part II.A.1-4.
123 376 A2d 359 (Conn. 1977) ("Horton I") (invalidating education finance system
under the strict scrutiny afforded to fundamental rights under the state equal protectiun
clause).
124 Horton v. Meskill, 486 A.2d 1099, 1101 (Conn. 1985) ("Horton II").
125 See id.
126 Id. at 1101 n.2.
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nated target district, the formula ensures horizontal equity among tax
payers of different districts.127
Education finance reform litigation in Arkansas elicited a similar
legislative response. The School Finance Act of 1984128 contained a
guarantee that state aid per student ·will supplement a school district's
local expenditures to meet a minimum amount per student. 129 The
Act also required reassessment and equalization of property values
·within the state.130

2. ''Leveling Down": Spending Caps and Recapture
In a "leveling down" approach, the state ensures horizontal equity

among taxpayers of different districts by "recapturing" local money
raised in wealthier school districts and distributing it to poorer dis
trictsP1 For example, the California state legislature attempted to ad
here to the state supreme court's equal protection mandate in Serrano
Ilby enacting a plan to redistribute property tax revenues collected in
property-rich districts to property-poor ones.132 This leveling down
equality-based remedy so incensed the majority of California voters
that they preempted the measure by passing a ballot initiative called
Proposition 13,133 This constitutional amendment capped property
taxes at 1% of the assessed property value and prohibited implementa
tion of a statewide property tax. 134 The amendment forced any dis
trict wishing to raise funds though additional nonproperty taxes to
obtain voters' consent by a two-thirds majority. 135
The result of this measure was to transfer the bulk of education
financing from the local district level to the state level. 136 Critics
charged that although the state's plan distributed funds on a relatively
127 See id.. at 1101-{)2 & 1101 n.2. The Horton H court found tlte distribution of categor
ical grants for transportation, construction, and special education under the system en
acted in response to Horton I to be constitutional under a modified equal protection
analysis. I d. at 1105, 1108. The court required the plaintiff to make a prima facie sh01~ing
of a greater-than-de-minimis disparity in e.-..:penditure and then shifted the burden onto the
state to show that the disparities are the result of a legitimate government purpose and that
the disparities are not so great as to render the scheme unconstitutional. !d. at 1106.
128 ARK. CoDE ANN. § 6-20-301 to § 6-20-319 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991).
129 See Fayetteville Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Ark. State Bd. ofEduc., 852 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Ark.
1993) (upholding changes to the state finance system using equal protection analysis).
130 Id.
131 Verstegen, supra note 32, at 249.
132 See Hanif S. P. Hixji, Note, Inequalities in California's Public Scl1oal SJstem: The Under
mining ofSerrano v. Priest and the Need for a Minimum Standards SJstern ofEducation, 32 Loi·.
L.A. L REv. 583, 599-600 (1999).
133 Id. at 600.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See id.. at 600-{)1.
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equal basis, 137 it reduced local control over education and increased
the likelihood that other state finance obligations would take priority
over the security of funds needed to sustain education quality.tss
At the time of Serrano II, California ranked eighteenth in the na
tion for expenditures per average daily attendance (ADA) .139 It subse
quently dropped to forty-sixth, 140 and to forty-ninth in reading
proficiency. 141
Wyoming's initial legislative response to its state supreme court's
holding in Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler14 2 also
exemplifies a leveling down approach:
In response to Washakie's holding that school funding must depend
upon state wealth and not local wealth, the select committee pro
posed solutions to redistribute some local wealth to other districts.
Those solutions culminated in an amendment to the state constitu
tion authorizing the legislature to "recapture" revenues generated
by the [mandatory local tax of one dollar of tax per $1000 of prop
erty value] which exceeded an amount determined by formula. Lo
cal wealth remained a factor in the system, however, when the
optional mill levy was made available to the school districts accord
ing them the option of levying another six mills for their own
use.143

The legislature then allocated recaptured funds to school districts on
the basis of district "classroom units." 144 These classroom units de
rived from each district's average daily membership, adjusted to in
clude transportation and special education expenditures. 145 The
legislature then multiplied the total number of classroom units in a
district by a legislatively-determined classroom value for the state guar
antee amount. 146
The Wyoming Supreme Court struck down this system in Campbell
County School District v. State, 147 citing both equal protection and ade
quacy grounds. 148 Wyoming voters amended the state constitution to
allow the recapture of funds from wealthy districts for distribution to
137

A California appellate court upheld the education finance system developed by the

legislature after Proposition 13 took effect. Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Ct. App.
1986) ("Serrano III").
138 See Hilji, supra note 132, at 601.
139 Id. at 596.
140 See McUsic, supra note 114, at 112 (using 1994 statistics).
141
See id.
142 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
143 See Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1247 (Wyo. 1995).
144 ld. at 1248.
145 ld.
146 Id. at 1249.
147 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995).
148 See id. at 1266, 1279-80.
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property-poor districts, 149 and the legislature enacted recapture provi
sions in 1997.150
3.

Consolidating Tax Bases and School Districts

The Texas state legislature responded to the state supreme
court's invalidation of the state education finance system151 with a
plan to consolidate school districts. 152 Senate Bill 351, passed on
April12, 1991, consolidated Texas's 254 counties into 188 County Ed
ucation Districts (CEDs).I 53 Each multicounty CED was the taxing au
thority for the school districts it contained. 154 The legislature spread
tax revenues from wealthy districts among their property-poor neigh
bors by requiring that no CED exceed $280,000 in taxable property
value per ADA. 155 In addition, the legislature turned the existing t\vo
tiered formula for determining state aid into a three-tiered
formula. 156 First, CEDs that taxed at a rate of $0.72 per $100 in prop
erty value received the basic allotment of $2200 per student. 157 Sec
ond, CEDs could tax up to an additional $0.45 per $100 to raise funds
for instruction and facilities. 158 Third, local districts could raise funds
beyond the authority of the CED. 159
Wealthy districts challenged this reform, and on january 30, 1992,
the Texas Supreme Court invalidated it under Texas's constitutional
prohibition against a statewide property tax. 160 The legislature's new

plan, ultimately upheld, 161 retained both the two-tiered fonnula for
determining a district's state aid and the consolidation of tax bases,
SeeWvo. CoNST. art. 15, § 17.
See Lincoln County Sch. Dist No. 1 v. State, 985 P.2d 964, 966 (Wyo. 1999)
(describing the recapture provisions found in 1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 3, §§ 101-701).
151
See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tc.x. 1991) ("Edgewood
IT'); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tc.x. 1989) ("Edgewood 1"). In
both cases, the overturned system consisted of some \'3riation on a minimum c.x-penditure
("Foundation") system that used a two-tiered formula to calculate need. See Edgro:aad H,
804 S.W.2d at 495. In a notable display of judicial acti\ism, the Edgro:ood H court specifi
cally recommended tax-base consolidation as a remedy. /d. at 497; see]. StC\·en Farr &
Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for Edurolion Equilj~ 17 Y.\LE L. &
PoL'Y REv. 607, 653 (1999).
152 See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 151, at 660.
153 An Act Relating to Public Schools, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law. Sen•. ch. 20 (Vernon).
154 See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 151, at 661.
155 /d.
156 See id.
157 Id.
158 /d.
159 Id.
160 Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826
S.W.2d 489, 493 (Tex. 1992) ("Edgewood Ill"). The court also held the plan IC\icd an ad
vakrrem tax without a referendum in \iolation ofTE.x. Co:.;sr. art VII§ 3. Edgro:aad IH, 826
S.W.2d at 493.
161
See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tc.x. 1995) ("EdgC\•;ood
149
150

IV").

HeinOnline -- 86 Cornell L. Rev. 667 2000-2001

CORNElL LAW REVIEW

668

[Vol. 86:644

school districts, or both, as an option for districts with a tax base
greater than $280,000 per ADA.162
4.

Giving Districts a Choice Among Various Equity Remedies

The current Texas plan contains other equity remedies that this
Note has not heretofore addressed. As mentioned above, the current
system in Texas determines state aid using a two-tiered formula. 163
Tier one, the Foundation program, consists of block grants of $2300
per pupil in districts that tax $0.86 per $100 property value.I 64 Tier
two is a guaranteed yield program, whereby districts with property
value ofless than $205,000 per pupil in ADA can tax at a rate between
$0.86 and $1.50 per $100 property value. 165 For each penny above
$0.86 that the district taxes, the state contributes an additional $20.55
per weighted ADA. 166 Furthermore, any district with property wealth
greater than the threshold amount of $280,000 per ADA must take
steps to reduce its tax base in one of five ways: (1) consolidating with a
property-poor district; (2) detaching commercial property and al·
lowing it to be annexed to a property-poor district, thereby increasing
the poor district's tax base; (3) purchasing "attendance credits" from
the state (essentially a form of recapture resulting in funds sent to the
state); (4) contracting for the education of nonresident students; or
(5) consolidating tax districts by setting up a mini-CED.l67
Although the Texas Supreme Court conceded that this system
fails to provide absolute equity, 16S the court also found that this system
meets the requirements of the state constitution. 169 Giving wealthy
See id. at 727.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 151, at 630-81.
See id. at 681.
Id. Texas also has an Available School Fund (ASF) (consisting of fund interest and
revenue) that is dispersed among districts on the basis of ADA. Id. at 682. ASF
funds are distributed in lieu of, not in addition to, foundation aid and guaranteed yield.
ld. Therefore, the state aid that a district is entitled to consists of: tier one allotment plus
guaranteed yield from tier two minus per capita allotment from ASF, minus the district's
local share of tier one and two property tax revenue raised. See id.
167 Id. at 683.
168 See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 729-30 (Tex. 1995)
("Edgewood IV"). Plaintiffs challenged the system based on the $600 per-pupil gap in
revenue between property-rich and -poor districts taxing at the maximum of $1.50 per
$100 in property value. See id. at 731. Property-poor districts taxing at the maximum re·
ceived state funding of $2300 per pupil plus the additional $20.55 for every cent between
$0.86 and $1.50, or $1315, for a total of $3615 per pupil. Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note
151, at 687. At the same time, districts with the maximum property value of $280,000
taxing at $1.50 per $100 in property value could raise $4200 per pupil. I d.
169 Edgewood IV; 917 S."W.2d at 737. The trial court had previously held that an "effi·
dent" system required by the Texas Constitution demanded absolute equity. Id. at 730.
The supreme court adopted a different approach, interpreting "efficient" as demanding a
level of adequacy achieved by the current system's substantial equity. I d. at 730.
162
163
164
165
166
gas tax
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districts options regarding reduction of their tax yield made Texas's
unique approach of coupling a guaranteed yield formula with the
equivalent of a spending cap (in the form of a maximum property tax
base) more palatable. 170 Indeed, the system has already achieved
some measures of success, including increases in the percentage of
equalized revenue, in revenue available per pupil in poor districts, in
the overall amount of education funding, and in student performance
on statewide testing.I71
B. Adequacy Elements of Reform
In general, adequacy-based remedies differ from equity-based
remedies in many ·ways. First, if a state supreme court deems all
schools in a state inadequate, then an adequacy-based reform will
have the effect of elevating all schools to a state-prescribed minimum
adequacy level.1 72 Second, if certain groups of students have special
needs, an adequacy-based reform will ensure that those groups receive
the additional funding they require to meet state-determined stan
dards for academic achievement. 173 Third, by taking into account
both a district's outputs and inputs, adequacy remedies seek to maxi
mize the outcome-to-input ratio (i.e., "efficiency") and thus contain
assessment and accountability components.174
From a education policy standpoint, adequacy-based remedies
are more complex than equity-based remedies, which seek to equalize

170 In 1993-94, ninety-eight of Texas's 281 districts e.xceeded the $280,000 property
''alue threshold. Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 151, at 684. Si.xty-four optioned to
purchase attendance credit, thirty opted to contract to educate students from other dis
tricts, while four opted for a combination of attendance credits and contracting for stu
dents. Id. No district opted for consolidation or detachment. Id.
171 See id. at 706; see also Craig D. Jerald, Tlze Stale of the States, Eot:c. WEEK (Qu.u.m·
CoUNTS 2000),Jan. 13, 2000, at 62, 62 (noting that "Te.xas'[s] Mrican-American and His
panic students performed as well as or better than the average 8th grader in the other
populous, ethnically diverse states of California, Florida, and New York·). In 1997-98,
Texas school districts with the lowest effective ta.x rates (including Edgewood) and districts
with the highest total effective ta.x rates (including Alamo Heights) had total per-pupil
expenditures of $5245 and $4984 respectively: a difference of 4.9%. &e TE.". DEP'T Eouc.
SNAPSHOT

'98: TAX EFFORT: SUMMARY TABlES (1999), at http://\mw.tea.statc.t".us/pcrfrc

port/snapshot/98/ta.xeffort.html
172 See generally Martha I. Morgan et al., Establishing Education Program Inatkquacy: The
Alabama Example, 28 U. MICH. J.L REroRl\l 559 (1995) (lauding legislati\'e reform that iJn..
plemented adequacy standards in Alabama using a combination of state and national stan
dards for inputs and outcomes}.
173 See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A2d 359, 408-10 (NJ. 1990) (ordering high per
student spending for pupils' "special educational needs"}; see also, e.g., Sheffv. O'Neill, 609
A2d 1072, 1074-76 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992) (considering racial and economic segregation
as factors in the deprivation of a "minimally adequate education•); William H. Clune, Edu
cational Adequacy: A Theory andlts Remalies, 28 U. MtCH.J.L REFoRM 481,487 n.22 (1995)
(discussing Sheff and AbboU).
174 See Clune supra note 173, at 481.
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economic inputs. 175 Courts mandating adequacy-based remedies may
require legislatures to define adequacy standards (if the court has not
already done so), implement or modify mechanisms by which to eval
uate school districts' achievement of those standards, or implement or
modify the state's financial structure to afford districts the means to
perform self-evaluation.176

Courts differ in their approaches to defining adequacy standards.
Some are reluctant to perform a policymaking role and leave it up to
the state legislatures to define adequacy. 177 Lack of guidance from
the court, however, can be problematic during the remedy phase. 178
Conversely, courts that define adequacy too extensively run the risk of
constraining the legislature. 179 Either way, guidance from the courts
largely influences states' education reform efforts.
1.

Kentucky's Model Adequacy Reform

In response to the Kentucky Supreme Court's invalidation of the
state's system for funding education after finding the "entire system of
common schools" to be unconstitutional, 180 the Kentucky General As
sembly enacted one of the most comprehensive legislative reform
plans to date. 181 The Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990
(KERA) 182 was a direct response to the seven factors of adequacy the
supreme court defined earlier in &se. 183 In order to assure that edu-

175 See id. at 485. But see Robinson, supra note 5, at 494-95 (arguing from a taxation
standpoint that adequacy remedies are less complex because they are concerned with qual·
ity of service rather than differences in resources).
176 See Clune, supra note 173, at 487-90.
177 See, e.g., City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A2d 40,56 (R.I. 1995) (deferring to the
legislature to define adequacy); cJ. Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139,
152 (Tenn. 1993) (declining to address the issue of adequacy in light of plaintiffs' strong
equal protection claim); William F. Dietz, Note, Manageable Adequacy Standards in Education
Refonn Litigation, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1193, 1205-06 (1996) (suggesting that the Tennessee
Supreme Court's use of equal protection analysis was an attempt to avoid defining
adequacy).
178 See Dietz, supra note 177, at 1206-07. For example, after the Texas Supreme Court
struck down the state education finance system on adequacy grounds without defining
adequacy standards in Edgewood I, it found the legislative responses inappropriate remedies
in two subsequent cases, Edgewood II and Edgewood Ill, before it finally found the legislative
response to be constitutional. See supra Part ll.A.3.
179 In New Jersey, for example, the supreme court imposed specific mandates and en·
joined particular expenditures. See Dietz supra note 177, at 1207.08 (describing the upoliti·
cal struggle among all three branches of government in New Jersey" that erupted when the
court sought to specifically mandate education reform measures).
180 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989).
181 See Molly A Hunter, All EJes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Refonn ir1
Kentucky, 28J.L. & Eouc. 485,499 (1999); C. Scott Trimble &Andrew C. Forsaith, Achieving
Equity and Excellence in Kentucky Education, 28 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 599, 609 (1995).
182 See Kentucky Education Reform Act, ch. 456, 1990 Ky. Acts 1208 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of KY. REv. STAT. ANN., cbs. 156-165 and other scattered
chapters).
183 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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cation outcomes met minimum standards of student achievement,
such as standardized test scores and dropout rates, 1M KERA's drafters
aimed their reform efforts at the areas of curriculum, governance, and
finance. 185
KERA's financial reform consists of a leveling up equity ap
proach: a foundation program that guarantees a minimum per-pupil
expenditure statewide. 186 Districts must tax property at the equalized
rate of $0.30 per $100 of assessed value (called the Equivalent Tax
Rate, or ETR) to qualify for a base level of adjusted per-pupil funding
from the state. 187 Districts are allowed to supplement state aid accord
ing to a two-tiered formula. 188 A tier I district may levy additional
property taxes to yield revenue of no more than 15% of the minimum
guaranteed base. 189 Districts electing to participate in tier I that have
property wealth 150% below the statewide average per-pupil assess
ment also receive equalization funds. 190 A tier II district may generate
additional funds up to 30% of the minimum, guaranteed base, but is
not entitled to equalization funds. 191 Tier II, essentially a revenue cap,

is credited ·with lowering expenditure disparities between property
rich and property-poor districts. 1 92 But because the tier ll cap ex
empts the wealthiest districts, critics argue that the plan fails to narrow

the expenditure gap between the extreme ends of the property wealth
spectrum. 193 However, KERA's finance reform increased local and
state spending on education in the year follmving its enactment by
$700 million over the previous year. 194 This additional funding al
lowed for an overall increase in per-pupil funding and teacher salaries
and for reduction of class sizes. 195 KERA also implemented the Facili
ties Support Program, which equalizes local funds for construction
and renovation. 196
KERA's curriculum-based provisions first establish goals and stan
dards designed to be more challenging than previous minimum aca
demic standards. 197 KERA requires schools to assess student
See Clune, supra note 173, at 485.
Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 181, at 610.
KY. REv. STAT• .ANN. § 157.360 {Banks-Bald\\in 1999).
Id. § 160.470(12)(a).
Id. § 157.440.
Id. § 157.440(1) (a).
Id. § 157.440(1)(b).
Id. § 157.440(2) (a).
Prior to KERA's implementation, the Kentud.1' school districts saw a 35.87% dispar
ity in wealth. Following KERA's implementation, the disparity fell to 16.72%. Ste Kelly,
supra note 119, at 406.
193 E.g., id.
194 Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 181, at 599-600.
195 Hunter, supra note 181, at 502.
196 Id. at 503.
197 See id. at 501.
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
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performance in grades four, eight, and twelve with comprehensive
testing. 198 It also fosters school accountability by rewarding or sanc
tioning schools based on assessment results. 199 KERNs governance
reform consists of restructuring provisions designed to reduce politi
cal impact on education policy. 200 Specifically, it transferred gov
erning authority to local schools while reducing the size of the state
Department of Education. 2o1
Although it has only been five years since KERA's implementa
tion, Kentucky schools are showing signs ofimprovement.2o2 The Na
tional Assessment of Educational Programs has documented
consistent improvement of Kentucky students in writing since the
state's reform efforts began.203 Statewide assessment in 1998 revealed
top-twenty performances by several high-poverty elementary
schools.204 The General Assembly continues to modify its assessment
and accountability efforts.2os

2. Following Kentucky's Lead: Education Reform in Massachusetts
Following the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court ruling that the state's education system violated the mandate of
the state constitution's education clause to "cherish" the state's public
schools,206 the Massachusetts legislature responded with comprehen
sive reform. Like KERA, the Massachusetts Education Reform Act of
1993 (:MERA) 207 consists of measures to equalize inputs, perform as
sessment, and foster district accountability. 208 MERA's finance reform
198 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 158.6453. Kentucky's performance-based assessment is de·
signed to evaluate how a student organizes, communicates, and applies knowledge. See
Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 181, at 614-15. In addition to traditional multiple choice
questions, the assessment program includes performing arts assessment and writing portfo
lios. See id. at 617. In 1998, the General Assembly modified the assessment component of
the original KERA by creating the Commonwealth Accountability Testing System, which
retains the comprehensive means of testing, but reduces the potential sanctions for dis
tricts that do not meet testing standards. Hunter, supra note 181, at 515.
199 See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 158.6455.
200 See Trimble & Forsaith, supra note 181, at 611-12.
201 Id. at 611. Every school has a management council on which the principal, three
teachers, and two parents sit. Hunter, supra note 181, at 500. The councils make decisions
regarding curriculum, textbooks, staffing, discipline, and the budget. Id.
202 See Hunter, supra note 181, at 514-15.
203 NAT'L Crn. FOR Eouc. STATISTics, U.S. DEP'T Eouc., THE NAEP 1998 READING fu:.
PORT CARD NATIONAL & STATE HtGHUGHTS 14, available at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsre·
portcard/pubs/mainl998/1999479.shtml (reporting Kentucky as one of only five states ln
which average reading scores among fourth graders in 1998 were significantly higher than
in 1992).
204 Hunter, supra note 181, at 515.
205 See id.
206 McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 553-54 (Mass.
1993).
207 MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 71 (Law. Co-op. 1996 & Supp. 2000).
208 See Kelly, supra note 119, at 410-14.
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is a leveling up approach, but with no ceiling on the amount of reve

nue wealthy districts can raise. 209 MERA created curriculum frame
work committees, assessment programs, and a governance structure
that shifts control and responsibility to local schools.210 Threat of
sanction encourages schools to strive to meet state testing
standards.211
Indicators show early signs of success for Massachusetts's reform
efforts. In 1999, the Iowa Test of Basic Skills showed 31% of Massa

chusetts third-graders in the "advanced reader" category, up ten per
centage points from the 1998 results.2I2
C.

Common Critiques of Equity and Adequacy Reform

Both those who favor education reform generally as well as those
who oppose it have criticized equity-based reform. Some education
reformers point out that the drawback to equity reform is that strict
per-student spending threatens funding that enables districts to ad
dress special needs. For instance, urban schools with security needs,
schools with high numbers of special education students, and schools
·with high numbers of non-English-speaking students simply have
higher per-pupil costs than other districts that do not get factored into
the state allocation formula. 213 On the other side of the debate, some
critics of equity-based reform use it as a reason to oppose progressive
reform generally. They argue that equity-based remedies waste money
in low-income districts in which, according to the argument, students
do not benefit from expensive amenities and college preparatory pro
grams.214 Furthermore, opponents of general reform note that sup
porters of equity-based reform are unable to find evidence that
equalization of funding equalizes education, but argue instead that
factors such as levels of parent education, wealth, and involvement in
209

Id. at 412.

See id. at 412-13.
211 See id. at 413. :Massachusetts also implemented a new statC\\ide testing program
implementing a requirement that tenth graders must meet testing requirements in order
to graduate. See Memorandum from David P. Driscoll, Commissioner, to MembeJ"S of the
Board of Education (Nov. 16, 1999), available at http://\\1\1'/.doe.mass.edu/mc:as/
112399memo.html. The graduation requirement of the Massachusetts Comprehensi\'e kr
sessment System (MCAS) has pro\'ed to be controversial. See Coco McCabe, Schaals Debating
Impact of MCAS, BosroN GLOBE, Dec. 10, 2000, at 1. Mter 45% of tenth graders failed
English and 34% failed math on the 2000 test, the state board of education approved a
plan that would allow students at least five more chances to pass and to take retests that do
not include the hardest questions. ScottS. Greenberger & Corey Dulling, MC"iS Rttest Plan
Approved, BosroN GLOBE, jan. 24, 2001, at B4.
212 See Press Release, Mass. Dep't ofEduc., Grade Three Iowa Reading Test Results are
Released (July 20, 1999), available at http://\'IW\v.doe.mass.edu/news/archives99/
072099g3r.hnnl.
213 See McUsic, supra note 114, at 106.
214 See id.
210
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schools are more likely to have an impact than dollar figures on a
balance sheet. 215 Finally, it is difficult for equity-based reform to es
cape the criticism that it will bring about the "dumbing-down" of pub
lic schools. 216
In contrast, adequacy reform is often heralded as a more
thoughtful approach to education reform because it addresses not
only a system's inputs, but also uses assessment and accountability
measures to monitor a system's outputs.217 Furthermore, adequacy re
form is often less controversial because it poses a "less immediate"
threat to local control. 218 However, not all reform proponents share
in the praise of adequacy reform. Adequacy reform is less likely to
result in absolute horizontal or vertical equity, as evidenced by the
experience of Texas, Kentucky, and Massachusetts. 2 19 Given the
seemingly arbitrary determinations of what constitutes "adequate,"
some critics advocate more objective measures of equality,2 20 In the
words of Justice Marshall, "the question of discrimination in educa
tional quality must be deemed to be an objective one that looks to
what the State provides its children, not to what the children are able
to do with what they receive."221
III
NEw HAMPsHIRE AND VERMoNT's EDUCATION FINANCE
REFoRM EFFORTS

A.

New Hampshire's Legislative Response to Claremont

As Claremont Ils April 1, 1999, deadline approached, the New
Hampshire legislature considered alternative tax reform plans: one
raising revenue for education through a statewide property tax and
another generating the funds through a 4% income tax. 222 Both
plans proved controversial in the "Live Free or Die" state, which to

215 See id. at 107.
216 See id.
See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 5, at 497.
Id. at 495. Robinson means "less immediate" in the sense that adequacy reform
does not displace local control over fmances, although it may result in state-mandated
school district performance standards.
217

218

See supra Part II.A.4, B.l-2.
One critic cites the variety of adequacy definitions in court opinions as evidence of
the true arbitrariness of the concept: "To me, it is not at all self-evident why certain aspects
of an adequate education-such as sufficient knowledge of one's 'mental health'-arc in·
eluded within the courts' definitions, and others-such as sufficient exposure to those of
different backgrounds and cultures-are excluded." James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and
School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 529, 549 (1999).
221 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 84 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
222 Anand, supra note 95.
219
220

HeinOnline -- 86 Cornell L. Rev. 674 2000-2001

2001]

"A" FOR EFFORT

675

date had no income, sales, or statewide property tax.223 Finally, on
April 29, 1999, almost a month past the deadline, the legislature en
acted House Bill 117,224 an $825 million education spending plan,
most of which was to come from a statewide property tax of $6.60 per
$1000 equalized property value on both residential and utility prop
erty.225 The plan required the state treasurer to deposit all revenue
collected in an education trust fund. 2 2 6 From this fund, the state
would pay "adequate education grants" 227 to districts with property tax
revenue below the "per pupil adequate education cost,"228 an amount
equal to the adequate education cost multiplied by the ADA in that
district. 229 Under the plan, districts that raised education property tax
revenue in excess of the adequate education grant for which they
were eligible under the formula would be liable to the state for that
amount. 230 The legislature intended to phase in this liability over five

years.231 Furthermore, the legislature authorized districts to "develop
educational programs beyond those required for an adequate educa
tion and to raise and appropriate amounts necessary for such
programs. "232
The New Hampshire Supreme Court weighed in on the constitu
tionality of the education finance plan in October of 1999.233 The
court declared unconstitutional the provisions creating the five-year
phase-in of statewide property tax liability for districts whose statewide
property tax revenue exceeded their adequate education grant alloca
tion.234 Property-wealthy districts continue to challenge the constitu223

Id.
See Act of Apri129, 1999, 1999 N.H. laws ch. 17.
225 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 76:3 (Supp. 2000). The tax reform measure also consisted
of a business enterprise ta.-c, Act of April29, 1999, ch. 17, §21 (to be codified at N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN.§ 77-E:2), and a cigarette tax increase, id. ch. 17, § 23 (to be codified at N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN.§ 78:32).
226 Id. § 198:39 ("Moneys in such fund shall not be used for any purpose other than to
distribute adequate education grants to municipalities' school districts pursuant to RSA
198:42.").
227 Id.
228 Id. § 198:40. The formula determined per-pupil adequate education cost by multi
plying the lowest per-pupil expenditure in districts where 40% to 60% of the elementary
school students enrolled achieved a score on state\\ide education assessment tests of basic
or above. Id. § 198:40(1) (b) (1).
229 Id. § 198:41(1)(a). The formula also takes into account transportation costs and
education property tax warrants. Id. § 198:41(1) (b)-(c). The average daily attendance is a
weighted figure which takes into account disabled students and students eligible for free or
reduced-price meals. Id. § 198:40(11).
230 Id. § 198:46, amended by Act of June 6, 2000, 2000 N.H. Laws ch. 239, § 8 (to be
codified at N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 198:46).
231 Id. § 198:46(1V).
232 Id. § 198.43.
224

233
234

Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 744 A.2d 1107 (N.H. 1999) (~Claremont V").
Claremont V, 744 A.2d at 1108. The court points out tlmt, under the plan, in 1999

property-poor towns (for example, Claremont and Allenstown) had to pay the $6.60 per
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tionality of the statewide property tax and some are withholding their
property tax liability to the state.235
B. Vermont's Legislative Response to Brigham
The Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1997 ('~ct 60")

1.

In June of 1997, the Vermont legislature responded to the Brig
ham decision by enacting the Equal Education Opportunity Act of
1997, colloquially known as "Act 60."236 The Act adopted as its under
lying policy the notion that "all Vermont children will be afforded ed
ucational opportunities which are substantially equal although
educational programs may vary from district to district. "237 This sec
tion will address Act 60's main components, which consist of: (a)
block grants from the state supported by a statewide property tax; (b)
measures to equalize local spending; and (c) provisions regarding as
sessment and accountability.
a.

Block Grants and Equalized Local Spending

Act 60 requires the state to allocate block grants of $5000 per
"equalized" pupil in each school district. 238 A variety of revenues sup
port the block grant allocation, including revenue from a statewide
education property tax and local property tax revenues from school
$1000 property rate, while their property-rich counterparts (for example, Rye and
Moultonborough) had to pay less ($3.79 per $1000 and $3.18 per $1000, respectively). /d.
at 1109. The court denied that the phase-in constituted a legitimate partial abatement
because it did not limit tax relief to persons aggrieved by assessment of the tax. /d. In·
stead, the court found the plan was overinclusive in its favorable tax treatment to those not
in jeopardy of suffering economic hardship as a result of the new rate scheme. See id. at
1111.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court then rendered an advisory opinion calling a re·
vised plan unconstitutional. Opinion of the Justices (Reformed Public School Financing
System), No. 00-179, 2000 WI.. 1800528 (N.H. Dec. 7, 2000). The court emphasized that
any funding mechanism that relied on local funding to support the cost of an adequate
education-up to the baseline adequacy amount-would violate the state constitution's
education clause. Id. at *2.
235 See Alton Vo~ Give Blessing to Tax Revolt, AssoCIATED PRESS, jan. 171 2000, available
at WI.. APWIRES 02:18:00; Carey Goldberg, A Tax Revolt Grows in New Hampshire: 'Donrn·
Towns' that Pay More WiU Challenge New System in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1999, at A9; Ann
E. Marimow, Donor Towns Sue State: They A?gUe Taxation Method is Still Unfair, CoNCORD
MoNITOR, Dec. 23, 1999, at AI, AS.
236 Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1997, 1997 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 60 (codl·
fled as amended in scattered sections of titles 16 and 32 ofVT. STAT. ANN.).
237 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1 (Supp. 2000).
238 See Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1997 § 24(a). $5000 is adjusted upward
from the fiscal year 1997level based on an annual state index. In 1999 the block gmnt per
equalized pupil is $5377. SeeVT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 4011. Use of"equalized pupilH results
in a weighted average daily membership, which takes into account economically deprived
pupils and pupils for whom English is a second language. I d. § 4010(c), (d).
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districts with budgeted spending in excess of the amount receivable
under the state block grant calculation.239
b. Equalization Measures

Under Act 60, the education property ta.x is itself equalized, in
that it applies a rate of $1.10 per $100 of nonresidential property, but
makes certain sensitivity adjustments that take into consideration the
taxpayer's household income and the amount of the tro..-payer's local
district property tax.240
Act 60 also enacted equalization of local education spending "so
that each school district will have substantially equal capacity to raise
and provide the same amount per pupil on the local ta.x base" by im
plementing a local share state education property tax.2 41 Under the
statutory tax formula, a district is liable to the state for a percentage of
the funds it raises in local property taxes in excess of its state block
grant entitlement.242 The Commissioner of Education sets this
"equalized yield amount" each year. 243 For example, in fiscal year
1997, for every $42 above the $5000 block grant amount that a district
desired to spend per pupil, it ·was liable to the state for 1% of the
funds raised towards that amount.2 44 Property-poor districts are eligi
ble for the revenue collected in this way. 245
In summary, Act 60's effect on each district is determined by a
comparison of the amount receivable by the district from the state to
the amount the district must pay to the state in education property
taxes and local share state education property taxes. Amounts receiva
ble from the state include the block grant allocation, other state allo
cations in nonblock form (such as for special education), property tax
reduction payments to qualified low income tro..-payers, and funds
from the sharing pool for qualified property-poor towns.246 Qualified
239 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 4025(a) (1)-(2). The education fund also includes revenue
from the state lottery, a portion of revenue from a meals, room, and alcohol ta."(, and a
portion of corporate income tax, among other sources. /d. § 4025(a) (4)-(6).
240 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5402(a) {Supp. 2000); id. § 6066.
241 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 4000(b); id. § 4011, amended bj• 2000 Vt. Acts&: Resoh·es No.
108.
242 /d. § 4025(a) (2).
243 /d. § 4027(a).
244
See VERMONT LEAGUE OF CmES &: TowNs, EDUCATION FINA...;CE FEATURES OF Ac::r 60,
as amended (1998), at http:/h\1YW.act60.org/vlct_doc.htm. [hereinafter Eot:CATIOS Ft.
NANCE FEATURES).

245 SeeVT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 40ll{b), amended b)' 2000 Vt. Acts&: Resoh·es No. lOS.
246 The activist group Concerned Vermonters for Equal Educational Opportunity pro
vides an example of how Act 60 results in net gains for towns that must contribute to the
sharing fund. See VERMONTERS FOR EQUAL Eocc. 0PPORTUI>oTIY, Ac::r 60: C.-\LCULATISG hs
EFFEcr oN YoUR TowN(2000), at http://W\\W.act60works.orglcalc.html. The town of Nor
wich, in fiscal year 1999, is eligible for: $4 million in block grants, $600,000 in nonblock
grant funds, $600,000 in property tax reduction payments, and $0 from the sharing pool,
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property-poor local districts may offset property tax liability by raising
revenues through a sales tax. 247

Allocation of Responsibility fw Assessment Between the Local
Districts and the State Board of Education
Act 60 reflects the mandate of the Brigham decision248 in that it
attempts to establish both equal access to quality education and local
district control over education programs. 249 Act 60's allocation of re~
sponsibilities between the State Board of Education and the local
school districts incorporates both of these goals. Under Act 60, the
State Board of Education has the power to set standards, develop as~
sessments, and issue statewide reports on school and student progress,
while the local school districts maintain responsibility for local action
plans, assessments, and accountability systems.25o
c.

2.

Challenging Act 60

In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld Act 60 against a
challenge brought by citizens from the property-rich, ski-resort town
of Stowe, who had created a plaintiff corporation.251 Mter the expira
tion of Act 60's transition provisions in 2002, the town of Stowe, in
order to maintain its level of funding, stands to be liable to the state
for nearly 70% of its local property tax revenue in local state share
property taxes. 252 The plaintiff corporation argued that the Act's reli~
ance on the discretion of voters in property-wealthy towns to supple~
ment state funding for education is an unconstitutional delegation of
the state's legislative authority. 253 The court rejected the plaintiff's
delegation doctrine claim254 and further held that the plaintiff was
precluded from suing based on "predictions" about how the Act might
violate the constitution when and if the citizens of Stowe voted to pr~
vide additional funds beyond the block grant amount.2M
for a total of$5.2 million. Nonvich is liable for $3,700,000 in state\vide education property
tax and a $500,000 contribution to the sharing pool, for a total of $4.2 million. The town's
net gain is $1 million, $600,000 more than the $400,000 in nonblock aid it would have
been eligible for \vithout Act 60. Id.
247 SeeVT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §138(b)(1) (Supp. 2000). These districts may also raise
revenues through a 1% meals, alcoholic beverages, and rooms tax. See id. § 138(b) (2)·(3).
248 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 4000(a).
249 Id. § 1.
250
See EDUCATION FINANCE FEATURES, supra note 244.
251 See Stowe Citizens for Responsible Gov't v. State, 730 A.2d 573, 574 (Vt. 1999).
252
Id. at 575.
253 Id. at 574.
254 Id. at 576 ("[A] statutory provision that does not take e1fect unless assented to by
the voters of a municipality 'is not invalid as a delegation oflegislative power, provided the
statute is complete in itself.'" (quoting 2 EUGENE McQUJWN, THE LA.W OF MUNICIPAL COR•
PORATIONS § 4.10, at 30 (3d ed. 1994))).
255
Stowe Citizens, 730 A2d at 576.
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3. Public Opinion and Proposed Legislative Changes
Act 60 has provoked outrage and concern among parents ofVer
mont schoolchildren residing in property-rich communities.256 Even
some communities that stand to benefit from the local share property
fund are concerned about the tax impact on businesses such as ski
resorts and factories that employ local citizens.257 Citizen groups on
both sides of this divisive issue have published detailed web sites.253
Some towns have retaliated against Act 60 by refusing to pay the state
its local share liability.259
As an alternative to Act 60, citizens and conservative lawmakers
have proposed the Education Revenue Sharing (ERS) plan, which
they contend meets Brigham's mandate for equalized educational op
portunity without relying on either a statewide property tax or recap
ture provisions.260 ERS would replace the Act 60 equalized yield/
block grant system ·with a "local property tax for funding of education
and a new formula for distribution of state aid which is based on the
income level of the school district residents. "261 Specifically, the state
would limit property tax liability and provide supplemental appropria
tions from the general fund to property-poor districts. 262 This system,
however, would not address the discrepancies among districts' prop
erty tax bases. Property-poor districts would still be taxed at a dispro
portionately higher rate as compared to property-rich districts, which
could continue to raise more revenue with lower tax rates.

256

The most famous parent to criticize Act 60 is novelist John Ining of The World

According to Garp fame. living called the legislarure "l\farxist[ ]"and predicted that "now
we will see those schools [in his property-rich district of Dorset] decimated." Amity Shlaes,
Vennont Levels Its Schcols, WAIL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1998, at A22.
257 See Shlaes, supra note 256, at A22.

258 For examples, see the pro-Act 60 Concerned Vermonters for Equal Education Op
portunity website at http://www.act60works.org. and the anti-Act 60 Vermont League of
Cities and Towns website at http://wmv.act60.org.
259 The towns of'\Vhitingham, Seaxsburg, and Dover were the initial holdout commu
nities that refused to pay their shares of Act 60 liability to the state. lAst Time Tawns Rthtl
ling Against Act 60 Settle Up with State, Apr. 10, 2000, aTJailahle at WL 4/10/00 AP\\1RES
15:24:00. Dover eventually paid voluntarily, but the attorney general had to sue Whi
tingham and Searsburg-and a superior court judge had to freeze the n,·o towns' bank
accounts-to elicit their shares of statewide property ta.xes. Id. One Vermont ncm'3paper
reports yet another holdout-the state's smallest to\m ofVictory. John Dillon, Victory Fights
Vennont on School Tax Sharing, RUTL-\ND HERALD, Nov. 5, 2000, http://rutlandher
ald.nybor.com/Archive/Articles/Article/15058.
260 See Tm: .AI:rERNATIVES GROUP, Eouc.~TION REVENUE SHAJU:-:c: A SE.'>SIBU: ALTERN".:\·
TI'VE: To Acr 60 (1999}, at http//www.act60.org/sharing.htm [hereinafter Em:c.\TIOS RE\"E
NUE SHARING].
261 H.B. 444, 65th Leg., Biennial Sess. (VL 1999).
262 The Bill was not carried over to the current legislati\"e session. Sa EDl'C.~TIOS RE\"E
NUE SHARING, supra note 260.
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IV
EVALUATION OF THE LEGISlATIVE REMEDIES OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE AND VERMONT

Foregoing attempts at guaranteed yield and equalization of dis
tricts' tax bases,263 New Hampshire and Vermont legislators have
equalized property tax rates by imposing statewide property taxes.264
New Hampshire's choice of this remedy is not surprising, given the
New Hampshire Supreme Court's holding in Claremont !that the legis
lature has a nondelegable duty to provide students with an adequate
education. 265 This stance led to the court's conclusion in Claremont II
that "'the taxes imposed by the legislature for support of schools •.•
are, in their nature, state taxes'"2 66 and that therefore "the taxing dis
trict is the State." 267 However, New Hampshire does not attempt to
recapture districts' local property tax revenue raised with the intent of
supplementing adequacy education grants, while Vermont has chosen
to make districts liable for a percentage of supplemental funds
raised.26S
A question faces legislators and voters in each state: Which system
will ensure educational adequacy for public school students while pro
viding an equitable system of taxation? This section addresses the eq·
uity and adequacy of both states' remedies.

A

Equitability of the Remedies of New Hampshire and Vermont

Horizontal equity (equity in per-pupil expenditure among dis
tricts), vertical equity (sensitivity to districts with special needs), fiscal
neutrality (equity of yield for tax effort among districts), income sensi
tivity (sensitivity to taxpayers with low income levels), and extent of
equalization (equalization of nonprogrammatic expenditures such as
263 See discussion supra Part II.Al. The Vermont Supreme Court specifically com·
mented on its then-existing "foundation formula" for distribution which was essentially a
guaranteed tax base:
From an equity standpoint, the major weakness of a foundation formula
distribution system is that it equalizes capacity only to a level of a minimally
adequate education program. . . . School districts with greater property
wealth, however, can more easily spend above foundation costs to improve
education, and the record before us shows that they usually make these
expenditures. Thus, a foundation-formula, state aid program can boost the
capacity of the poorest districts, but still leave substantial deficiencies in
overall equity.
Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 388 (Vt. 1997) (citations omitted).
264 See supra Part III.
265 See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993) ("Clare
mont I").
266 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A2d 1353, 1356 (Vt. 1997) ("Claremont II")
(quoting Opinion of the Court, 4 N.H. 565, 571 (1829) (alterations in the original),
267
268

!d.
See supra Part III.

HeinOnline -- 86 Cornell L. Rev. 680 2000-2001

681

"A" FOR EFFORT

2001]

plant and transportation costs) contribute to the overall equity of an
education reform system. The chart below summarizes the compari
son of the reform efforts of New Hampshire and Vermont on these
factors.
TABLE

Indicator
Horizontal Equity (equity in
per pupil expenditure
among districts)

1

New Hampshire Reform
(HB 117)

Lack of substantial equity as
districts are free to generate
revenue from local property
taxes '~ithout liability to the
state.

Vermont Reform (Act 60)
Substantial equity achiC\·ed
by imposing liability on
wealthy districts for spending abon~ the block grant
amount.

Vertical Equity (ensttring
that districts "ith special
needs have access to additiona! funds)

Adequacy grant calculated
Block grant is multiplied b)·
based on a weighted average a weighted :n·eraged dail)'
daily attendance figure that membership in a district,
takes into account the num- which takes into account ecber of students who are dis- onomically disad,·amaged
abled and economically dis- students {measured by eligiadvantaged (measured by el- bilit)• for food stamps) and
igibility for free or reduced
English-as-a-second-language
students.
lunch) in each district.

FIScal Neutrality (equity in
yield from tax effort among
districts)

Uniform state\\ide property Uniform statC\\ide propert)'
tax rate of $6.60 per $1000
ta.x rate of $1.10 per $100
property value. Howe,·er, ad- property value. Additional
ditionallocal property taxes local propert)• ta.xes mar be
have no uniformity rate.
leo.ied at nonuniform rate.
None269
Ta.'l'ayers \\ith household
incomes Jess than $75,000
may pay the lesser or (a) 2%
of their income or (b) the
ta.x the munidpalit)' would
have assessed on propert)' if
the value were reduced by
$15,000.:.!70 Additional relief
is pro\ided for tm.l'ayers
\\ith household income of
less than $47,000.:.!71

Income Sensitivity

Equalization of nonprogrammatic costs

Costofconstruction,transportation, and special educalion are not included in the
state's base CAl'enditure per
pupil; therefore, these costs
are not equalized.

Special education funds are
distributed at the state leo.-cl
separate from block
grants.27'..!

269 In fact, New Hampshire's constitution prohibits progressi\ity \',ilhin an)' single tax.
See N.H. CoNsr. pt. 2, art. 5.
270 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 6066(a) (1) (B) (Supp. 2000).
271 See id. § 6066(a) (3). Tax-payers nith annual household income between $25,000
and $47,000 are eligible for a property ta.x credit of 5%. I d. Ta.x-payers "ith annual house
hold income between $10,000 and $24,999 are eligible for a property ta." credit of 4.5%.
Id. Taxpayers with annual household income between $5000 and $9999 are eligible for a
property tax credit of 4%. Id. Ta'l'ayers \\ith annual household income less than $5000
are eligible for a property tax credit of 3.5%. Id.
272 The state makes total CA-penditures in each fiscal year equal to 60% of the total
statewide special education expenditures not derived from federal sources. VT. STAT. A,-:-;.
tit. 16, § 2967(b) (Supp. 2000).
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New Hampshire and Vennont Attain Fiscal Neutrality

As the chart illustrates, the uniform property tax rate ensures the
fiscal neutrality of both states' tax systems. As a result, residents' prop
erty taxes are proportional to property value. Both states have re
quired reassessment of property values according to statewide criteria
to ensure that the uniform rate is applied fairly to all property.278 If
property values are assessed too infrequently, the effects of the com·
peting forces of appreciation and depreciation go undetected, result·
ing in distorted relative property values.274
2.

Vennont Surpasses New Hampshire in Horizontal Equity and
Income Sensitivity

Both states' implementation of a statewide property tax creates a
distinction between "donor" towns and "receiver" towns. 275 Donor
districts have high property tax bases and therefore raise more than
their state entitlements by taxing at the uniform rate. 276 Receiver
towns have smaller property tax bases, so their property tax revenue is
less than their state entitlements; the state supplements the difference
between the state entitlement and the property taxes raised.277 Pay
ment from donor towns to receiver towns is a step toward horizontal
equity that narrows the gap between what property-rich and property
poor districts can afford to spend on education.
Vermont's system of taxation, with its limited recapture,278 pro
vides more horizontal equity than New Hampshire's system, which
does not limit districts in the amount of revenue they may raise to
273 See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 21:J:3 (XIII) (Supp. 1999) (imposing on the Commis
sioner of the Department of Revenue Administration the duty to "[e]qualize annually by
March 31 the valuation of the property in the several towns, cities, and unincorporated
places in the state"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 32, § 5405(a) (imposing on the commissioner of
taxes the duty to "determine the equalized education property tax grand list and cocffi·
dent of dispersion for each municipality in the state").
274 See Marcia A. Brown Thunberg, &ising Revenue for an Adequate Education in Netv
Hampshire, 20 VT. L. REV. 1001, 1037-39 (1996). Thunberg explains that when "one home
is assessed at fair market value during a town's assessment and a second home, built a few
years later, is assessed at a value comparable to the first," relative property values are dis
torted because "[a]lthough the two homes have the same assessed value, the possible in·
crease or decrease in value of the first home is not recognized." !d. at 1307. Evidence of
Thunberg's characterization of the problems caused by infrequent assessment has been
uncovered as New Hampshire now attempts to correct for years of disparate assessment.
For instance, one report indicates that the city of Keene consistently undervalued its prop
erty by 16% due to twenty-eight years of failing to conduct door-to-door property inspcc·
tions. See Geeta O'Donnell Anand, Way of Valuing Property in N.H. is Under Attach, WALL ST.
J.-NEW ENG., july 14, 1999, available at 1999 WL-WSJ 5460195.
275 Lisa Shapiro et al., The &anomie and Fzscal Impact of a Statewide Property Tax in New
Hampshire, STATE TAX TODAY, jun. 14, 1999, at ~2. available at WI.. 1999 SIT 113-16.
276 See id.

277 See id.
278 See supra Part III.B.1 (b).
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supplement their adequacy grant.279 Also, Vermont's income-sensitiv
ity provisions increase the equitability of its tax system.28 Further
more, Vermont includes more local costs in its equalization formula,
thereby ensuring that a district's designated financial needs include
such expenses as special education costs.2s1

°

3. Both Vennont and New Hampshire Strive for Vertical Eqllity
Both states strive for vertical equity by accommodating expenses
for students ·with special needs when calculating the ADA for the pur
pose of determining each district's block grants.282 It is difficult, how
ever, to predict whether merely factoring special-needs students into
the ADA accurately reflects the additional funding needed to finance
the particularized programs that special-needs students require.
B. Adequacy of the Legislative Remedies of New Hampshire and
Vermont
New Hampshire relies on the New Hampshire Educational Im
provement and Assessment Program (NHEIAP) tests as a measure of
"adequate" student performance when it calculates the cost of ade
quate education.283 However, it does not provide incentives for dis
tricts to increase performance on assessment indicators. In order to
establish the cost of an adequate education in the state, it merely
looks at how much "adequately" performing schools are spending.284
Some critics assert that, because New Hampshire's per-pupil adequate
education cost worked out to only $4220, the plan does not raise
enough revenue to provide for adequate education in property-poor
districts. 285

In contrast, Vermont's local districts remain responsible for cur
riculum development, and its districts face penalties for failure to
meet state-determined adequacy standards.286 In addition, the state
279

See supra Part ill.A.

280 See supra notes 270-71 and accompan)ing text.
281 See supra Part ill.B.l (b).
282 See supra Part ill.A; Part ill.B.l(b).
283 H.B. 117, 1999 Gen. Ct, !56th Sess. (N.H. 1999). The legislature acknowledges
that "[t]here is no single, empirically correct method of establishing the cost of an ade
quate education," but finds that "school districts that have 40 to 60 percent of students
scoring at or above the basic level on the NHEIAP tests are those districts that are meeting
the relevant outcome expectations and are providing an adequate education." Id. cb. 17,
§ 1(V).
284 See supra note 283.
285 E.g., Question: Is New Hampshire Raising Enough for School Spendi11g?, W,\LL. ST.j.-NEW
ENG., Aug. 11, 1999, availahle at 1999 WL-WSJ 5464092.
286 For example, if a district fails to meet "quality standards" set forth by Act 60 (in
cluded measures of things such as reading proficiency, access to current teclmology, com
munity support and early care) for two consecuti\·e two-year assessment periods, the
Commissioner of Education may recommend technical assistance from the state, adjust-
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encourages local districts to be innovative and self-promoting.28 7 Ver
mont's per-pupil state spending is $5282,288 unsurprisingly higher
than New Hampshire's because Vermont equalizes more of the costs
of education.
Suggestions for Further Reform

C.

1.

Generating Additional Funds

Successful education finance reform in New Hampshire and Ver
mont requires the generation of additional funds.28 9 Prior to New
Hampshire's reform litigation, critics cited the underfunding of the
then-current program290 as a primary cause of education inade
quacy.291 Therefore, it is unlikely that New Hampshire and Vermont
will improve the adequacy of the education they offer their students
unless they increase the amount of money dedicated to financing
education.
One indicator of adequacy is spending per pupi1.29 2 A national
comparison of per-pupil education spending (from both state and lo
cal sources) ranked New Hampshire thirty-third and Vermont forty
fifth for per-pupil expenditures. 293 Data from another source reflect
ment of the superintendent's responsibilities, state assumption of administrative control of
the district, or closing the school and requiring the district to pay tuition to another dis
trict. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 165(a)-(b) (Supp. 2000).
287 Districts may apply for up to $50,000 in "Challenge to Excellence" grants, awarded
for the financing of proposals to "promote quality education for all students within the
school" or "create educational opportunities for students" through "special classes and ac
tivities; mentorship; summer institutes on math, science, reading and language arts, social
studies, service, the arts or technology; partnerships for learning with businesses, post-sec
ondary institutions and community organizations; tutorials; programs for at-risk or gifted
students; guidance, peer counseling, and career planning activities." Id. § 215(b){2)·(3).
288 Act 60's transitional provisions set the block grant amount at $5000 per pupil, ad·
justed upward based on the "appropriate annual index for state and local government
purchased of goods and services." /d. § 4011 (transititional provision). In fiscal yeaer
1999, the adjusted amount was $5282. VERMONT LEAGUE OF CITIES AND ToWNS, EDUCATION
FINANCE FEATURES oF Acr 60, AS AMENDED Quly 15, 1998), available at http://www/
act60.org/vlct_doc.htm.
289 See John Augenblick, The Role of State Legislatures in School Finance Refonn: Loolii11g
Backward and Looking Ahead, in

STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITI': CREATING PRODUGfiV£

ScHooLS IN Ajusr SociE"IY 89, 95 (Marilyn J. Gittell ed., 1998). Augenblick lists several
factors as crucial to successful legislative remedies, including the stimulus of litigation,
availability of new funds, legislative leadership, efforts to inform the public, and reliance
on technical expertise. Id. at 94-97; see also Thunberg, supra note 274, at 100fH>9 (describ
ing recent studies finding correlation between economic resources and academic perform·
ance). But see Ryan, supra note 220, at 538-41 (downplaying the importance of monetary
remedies).
290 New Hampshire distributed Foundation Aid based on calculations using the
Augenblick formula. See supra note 69.
291 See Thunberg, supra note 274, at 1017; Interview with Andru Volinsky, supra note
67.
292 See Jerald, supra note 171, at 65.
293 /d. at 82 tbl.
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New Hampshire's willingness to increase total spending on education
at a faster rate than Vermont. 294 However, these increases take into
account both state and local district education e>.-penditures. Con
sider the comparison betw·een total per-pupil education e>.-penditures
and each state's share of that amount. New Hampshire's adequacy
grant formula worked out to a guaranteed $4220 per pupil in 1999,295
while the per-pupil expenditures including local districts' e>.-pendi
tures is estimated at $7046 per pupil.296 Thus, the state of New Hamp
shire contributes only 60% of the cost of an adequate education,
which finds the state ranked only thirty-third nationally. 297 Vermont's
block grant per pupil in 1999 worked out to be $5282,298 compared to
its total per-pupil expenditure of $6680,299 making the state responsi294

See LENA 1\L

McDowELL, NAT'L

CTR.

FOR Eot:c. STAnsncs,

U.S.

DEP'T OF Eot:c.,

EARLY EsTIMATES oF PUBuc ELEMENTARY AND SECO!'o'DARY Eot:CATios STAnsncs: ScHooL

YEAR 1998-99, at 3 tbl.1, 4 tbL2, 5 tbl.3, 6 tbl.4, 7 tbL5 (1999). McDowell reponed the fifty
states' total education expenditures and total swdent memberships for the fiSCal years
1995 to 1999. Id. From this data, I calculated the total per-pupil Cll.-penditures and the rate
of increase from year to year. As the follO\\ing chan illustrates, New Hampshire's percent·
age increase in total per-pupil education funding increased in the fiscal years follm·.ing
Claremont II; while Vermont shows no such trend follo\\ing Brigharrc.
TABLE

Tot:!l Per-Pupil
E.'q)Clldi ture
(E.'\-penditure/
%
Membership) Increase

Total E.'\:pendirures
(McDowell,
table 5)

Tot:!l Membership
(McDowell,
table 1)

$1,053,966,000

189,319

$5567

$1,114,540,000

194,171

$5740

3%

$1,173,958,000

198,308

$5919

3%

1998

$1,309,171,000

201,629

$6493

8.8%

1999

$1,370,542,000

194,512

$7046

7.8%

1995

$ 665,559,000

104,553

$6366

-

1996

$ 684,864,000

105,565

$6487

1.9%

1997**

$ 718,092,000

106,341

$6753

3.9%

1998

$ 707,083,000

105,984

$6672

-1.2%

1999

$ 704,331,000

105,442

$6680

0.1%

FIScal
Year
1995
1996
New
Hampshire 1997*

Vermont

2

-

* Claremont H decided.

** Brigham decided.

295
See supra note 228 (discussing New Hampshire's formula for determining adequacy
grant amounts); Geeta O'Donnell Anand, Claremont's VieJO!)' in ScMol Suit Has Came u>ilh a
Very High Price, WALL ST. J.-NEW ENG., Dec. 1, 1999, available at 1999 WL-WSJ 24923978
(reporting that the adequacy grant amount in fiscal year 1999 was $4220, "37% below the
average cost of educating a child in the state").
296 See supra note 294 tbl.2.
297
See supra note 293 and accompanying te.xt.
298
See supra note 288.
299
See supra note 294 tbl.2.
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ble for 79% of the total per pupil expenditures-a total that is forty..
fifth among all fifty states. 3oo
For the states to guarantee higher spending per pupil, they must
expand their revenue sources. One study predicts that for the state to
fund the entire cost of adequate education in New Hampshire solely
through the statewide property tax, it would have to increase the rate
from $6.60 per $1000 to $15 per $1000.301 Economists believe that
increased reliance on statewide property taxes may have the unin..
tended effect of deterring economic growth in both the business and
real estate sectors.302 Therefore, increasing or implementing other
broad-based taxes, such as an income tax or sales tax, politically un·
popular as they may be, are preferable methods of generating addi..
tiona! revenue.

2. Improving Equity
Equity is not only a judicial mandate arising from the Claremont
and Brigham decisions, it is also a necessary public policy. Excessive
reliance on local school districts to fund education appears increas..
ingly misplaced given trends in American demographics. An increas·

ing proportion of the population is elderly303 and the number of
families with school-age children is declining.30 4 These trends trans·
late into fewer numbers of citizens ·willing to vote for education spend
ing at a local level,305 which threatens to increase education funding
300 See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
301 See Shapiro et al., supra note 275, 'l[ 15.
302 See id. Donor towns that raise local property taxes in an effort to compensate for
their statewide property tax liability will deter economic growth of their local businesses.
See id. A statewide property tax disrupts the real estate market through capitalization,
which is "the general phenomenon whereby a stream of services or costs affects the value
of an asset." I d. 'l[ 72. For example, higher taxes reduce property values, while proximity to
better schools increases property values. Shapiro and her coauthors predict that the mar
ket disruptions caused by capitalization will make it difficult for homeowners to access the
capital they need to purchase homes. Id. 'l[ 117. This in tum will have a negative impact
on the real estate market and in tum may reduce the state's overall property tax base. !d. 1
118.
303 See U.S. CENsus BuREAu, U.S. DEP'T oF CoMMERCE, STATISTICAL AnsrnAcr m· TilE
UNITED STATES 1997, at 48 tbl.47 (117th ed. 1997) (reporting that the number of persons
aged sixty-five or older was 25.5 million in 1980, but is projected to increase to 34.7 million
in 2000).
304 See NAT'L CTR. FOR Enuc. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF Enuc., DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS 1996, at 25 tbl.17 (1997) (reporting that married-couple families with their own
children under 18 represented 41.9% of all families in 1980, 37.5% of all families in 1990,
and 36.6% of all families in 1994).
305 Robinson, supra note 5, at 509 ("An aging population is likely to be less concerned
about schools and more concerned about public goods that are important to them.")
Robinson points out that both public choice theory and empirical data support the disin·
clination of the elderly and families without school-age children to support public schools.
See id.
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disparities among communities. Thus, it is increasingly important to
equalize education funding at the state level.
Given the Vermont Supreme Court's e>..-plicit recognition of the
importance of equity in its education finance system,306 it is not sur
prising that the Vermont state legislature incorporated elements of
fiscal neutrality, horizontal equity, and vertical equity into its tax struc
ture.307 New Hampshire has only begun to foster tax equity by reduc
ing reliance on local property taxes to fund education.sos Research
indicates that both states have much to strive for in terms of equity.309
A national comparison of states' education spending patterns found a
17.5% differentiation in per-pupil expenditures among districts in
New Hampshire, the third highest percentage of all the states.310 Ver
mont fared slightly better; its 16.2% differentiation placed it sixth
highest natiomvide.311 While this study used pre-1998 data312 and
therefore does not reflect both states' most recent efforts to improve
equity among districts, it should signal to both states how far there still
is to go. Moreover, both states can increase horizontal equity by
equalizing more of the costs of education and limiting the extent to
which districts can raise additional funds.
3.

Texas-style Alternatives to Recapture

Though recapture has allowed Vermont to attain substantial eq
uity, it is a politically unpopular device because school districts view
recapture of revenue as state encroachment on local control of public
schools.313 In Texas, the legislature made the bitter pill of recapture
easier to swallow by giving districts the power to choose the means by
which they would support education state\vide.314 The Vermont legis
lature ought to consider alternative methods of inducing districts to
contribute a portion of the revenue raised above the block grant enti
tlement. Districts given the option to purchase attendance credits,
contract \vith students from other districts, submit commercial real
estate for attachment, or consolidate districts and/or property tax ba306 See Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 390 (Vt. 1997} (''While we recognize that equal
dollar resources do not necessarily ttanslate equally in effect, there is no reasonable doubt
that substantial funding differences significantly affect opportunities to learn. • • • Money is
clearly not the only variable affecting educational opportunity, but it is one that go\·em
ment can effectively equalize."}.
307 See supra Part ill.B.
308
See supra Part ill.A.
309
See supra Part IV.A.
310 See Jerald, supra note 171, at 67 tbL
311 See id.
312 See id.
313 See Edwards, supra note 16, at 34.
314 See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 151, at 679.
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ses might more readily accept their obligation to contribute to state
wide education.315
4.

Increasing Reliance on Performance Indicators

Had New Hampshire's legislative reform paralleled the reform
acts of Kentucky and Massachusetts in the same way that Claremont
paralleled Rnse and McDuffy, 316 New Hampshire also would have im
plemented the strong accountability measures now considered a key
to successful education reform. 317 As noted above, assessment indica
tors demonstrate improvement in Kentucky and Massachusetts school
systems.318 Other states, like Texas, have also implemented strong ac
countability measures, and these states document improving scores on
national indicators.319 Education Week magazine, in its yearly "Quality
Counts" issue, reports that Kentucky and Texas are among the "hand
ful" of states whose students have consistently improved their reading
and mathematics scores on the National Assessment of Educational
Progress, due in large part to their comprehensive legislative reform,
including accountability measures.320 It is thus imperative that New
Hampshire follow the lead of Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Texas, as
well as its neighbor Vermont, by holding school districts accountable
for the success of their students on pexformance indicators, either
through systems of rewards or sanctions.

5. Earmarking State Funds for Education
The potential downside of shifting education funding from local
to state sources is a diminished incentive for local taxpayers to invest
in education. 321 Taxpayers with school-aged children have obvious in
centives to vote for higher property tax rates under uncapped, une
qualized property-tax-based education finance systems.s22 Taxpayers
315 See id.
316 See Claremont Sch.

Dist. v. Governor, 703 A2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) ("Clare·

mont II").
317

See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 119, at 408 ("KERA appropriately includes two account.1•

bility mechanisms that encourage substantive change."); id. at 412-13 (heralding MERA's
assessment programs and school accountability for students' performance as "capable of
improving the quality of education in poor districts").
318 See supra Part II.B.1-2.
319 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
320 SeeJerald, supra note 171, at 62. Jerald includes Kentucky and Texas in a small list
of states that he considers to be "pace-setters in education policy," and notes that they
"consequently also score near the top on the Quality Counts indicators." !d. Attributing one
measure of success to specific accountability measures, Jerald goes on to discuss Texas's
minority student success in testing: "That kind of progress [does not] happen by accident,
Texas remains the only state to hold schools accountable for helping poor and minority
students meet the same achievement benchmarks as their peers." Id.
321 See McUsic, supra note 114, at 112.
322 See id at 113.
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without school-aged children also have similar incentives because
their property value increases with the quality of the local schooJs.S23
At the state level, the education lobby depends on these kinds of in
centives for its strength and its ability to defeat competing special in
terest groups.324 This problem is particularly threatening in New
Hampshire and Vermont for two reasons. First, both states have his
torically been unresponsive to the education lobby regarding state ap
propriations for the state university systems.325 Another is the strong
"anti-tax sentiments" in both states, especially New Hampshire,s2G

which compel state legislators to sacrifice education funds for tax
cuts.327
To compensate for this potential problem, New Hampshire and
Vermont should ensure that revenue generated in pursuit of equaliz
ing education is earmarked for education. Both states should propose
and ratify constitutional amendments to that effect. The New Hamp
shire state legislature has considered, but not yet adopted, a constitu
tional amendment that would invest the revenue generated from its
statewide property tax in an education trust fund and restrict its use to
the financing of public education.328 Provisions of this kind would
seiVe to protect education revenue from competing special interests
and ensure the long-term success of education reform.
CoNCLUSION

State legislatures attempting to comply ·with state supreme court
mandates to reform their education finance systems should strive to
meet the demands of both adequacy and equity. Reform efforts in
New Hampshire and Vermont demonstrate the potential for a dual
response: while Clare1TUJnt relied on the state education clause and
Brigham relied on the state equal protection clause, both state legisla
tures have incorporated elements of adequacy and equity into their
systems. The experiences of these two states suggest that regardless of
the catalyst for reform, education reform can and should include ele
ments of both equity and adequacy.
323 See id.
324 See id.
325 New Hampshire ranks forty-ninth

and Vermont fiftieth in the nation for higher
education funding. Peter Schmidt, As Eccnom)' Chugs Along, States Pour Mont:')' into Higlu:r
Education, CHRoN.. OF HIGHER Enuc., Dec. 17, 1999, at http://cbronicle.com/govemmenL
326 New Hampshire has neither an income ta.x, nor a sales ta." and instead relies on
"sin" taxes on liquor and cigarettes, room and meals ta.xes, gasoline taxes, and business
profits taxes. See Thunberg, supra note 274, at 1013. Only one other state, Alaska, has
neither a sales tax nor an income ta.'l{. See Norma Love, LcgiJlalure Apprrn.tes &haai Financing
Compromise, AssoCIATED PRESS, Apr. 29, 1999, available at WL APWIRES 16:09:00.
327 See McUsic, supra note 114, at 113.
328 See Constitutional Amendment Con. Res. 10, 156th Leg. (N.H. 1999).
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States like New Hampshire and Vermont, which meet their re~
spective supreme court mandates by implementing an equalized state~
wide property tax rate, impose a measure worthy of replication
because statewide property taxes ensure the fiscal neutrality, or pr~
portional effort, of state taxpayers. However, from a policy stand~
point, New Hampshire and Vermont demonstrate that states
implementing such measures must strive to ensure horizontal equity
and reduce the discrepancies between total per-pupil expenditures
among districts. It is no longer constitutionally or politically accept
able for a state to delegate the lion's share of its responsibility to pr~
vide education to local districts that vary in ability and willingness to
finance education.
Whether a state is in the initial stages of implementing court~
mandated reform, or whether it has been in the process for decades,
modern reform should incorporate the lessons of the last thirty years
of reform efforts in sister states. For instance, as Texas's reform dem~
onstrates, recapture is not the only way to ensure horizontal equity
and reduce funding disparities among school districts. States like New
Hampshire and Vermont, or those looking to their experiences for
guidance, should experiment with district consolidation, attachment,
attendance credits, and contracting with students from other districts.
They should also take steps to alleviate "local control'' issues by al~
lowing districts to choose the method by which they will contribute to
equalized state education funds.
As for adequacy, increasing state-guaranteed per-pupil expendi
tures is one way to ensure that schools have access to the funds they
need to retain quality teachers, implement curriculum refonn and ac
countability measures like those of Kentucky and Massachusetts, con~
struct and maintain schools, and meet the expenses of students with
special needs. Generating additional funds in the form of new or in~
creased taxes, as well as earmarking those funds raised for education,
are also necessary reform measures. Furthermore, to ensure efficient
use of funds, states with systems like New Hampshire's should hold
districts accountable for the success of their students.
States have always regarded education as an essential component
of a successful democratic system of government.829 However, in most
states, it took judicial efforts to catalyze legislative reform efforts and
encourage legislators to reiterate their states' commitment to educa~
tion. Though most states required judicial efforts to catalyze legisla~
tive reform and encourage legislators to reiterate their states'
commitment to education, successful reform requires state legisla
tures' continued dedication. If New Hampshire and Vermont are, in
329
State constitutions' education clauses demonstrate the importance of education.
See supra notes 49-54.
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Governor Shaheen's words, "guided by common sense and dedication
to our children's futures,"330 they can ensure that their initial mea
sures of reform are not the final steps towards serving quality educa
tion for all students of both states, and that over time New Hampshire
and Vermont will emerge as models for education reform in other
states.
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New Hampshire Governor Jeanne Shaheen, State of the State Address Qan. 7,

1998).
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